if rs != nil {
		h, err := rs.ToHeader()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, proxy, err
		}
		gopts.Set(xhttp.Range, h)
	}
	// Make sure to match ETag when proxying.
	if err = gopts.SetMatchETag(oi.ETag); err != nil {
		return nil, proxy, err
	}
	c := minio.Core{Client: tgt.Client}
	obj, _, h, err := c.GetObject(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, gopts)
	if err != nil {

		//		DriveOPTimeout: globalDriveConfig.GetOPTimeout,
		Interface:   ctxt.Interface,
		SendBufSize: ctxt.SendBufSize,
		RecvBufSize: ctxt.RecvBufSize,
	}

	// allow transport to be HTTP/1.1 for proxying.
	globalProxyEndpoints = GetProxyEndpoints(globalEndpoints)
	globalInternodeTransport = NewInternodeHTTPTransport(ctxt.MaxIdleConnsPerHost)()
	globalRemoteTargetTransport = NewRemoteTargetHTTPTransport(false)()

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

  // empty string (""), or a valid IP address. Setting this to "None" makes a
  // "headless service" (no virtual IP), which is useful when direct endpoint
  // connections are preferred and proxying is not required.  Only applies to
  // types ClusterIP, NodePort, and LoadBalancer. If this field is specified
  // when creating a Service of type ExternalName, creation will fail. This

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

## Metrics Changes

### Added metrics

- The metric `kube_proxy_sync_proxy_rules_last_timestamp_seconds` is now available, indicating the last time that kube-proxy successfully applied proxying rules. ([#74027](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/74027), [@squeed](https://github.com/squeed))

* Fixes a regression proxying responses from aggregated API servers which could cause watch requests to hang until the first event was received ([#75887](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75887), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

					if !isErrBucketNotFound(proxyGetErr) && !isErrObjectNotFound(proxyGetErr) && !isErrVersionNotFound(proxyGetErr) &&
						!isErrPreconditionFailed(proxyGetErr) && !isErrInvalidRange(proxyGetErr) {
						replLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Proxying request (replication) failed for %s/%s(%s) - %w", bucket, object, opts.VersionID, perr))
					}
				}
				if reader != nil && proxy.Proxy && perr == nil {
					gr = reader
				}
			}
		}