// Choice here is between failing with a correct RuntimeException
        // or mostly silently with an IOException
        url = urlLine.toHttpUrlOrNull() ?: throw IOException("Cache corruption for $urlLine").also {
          Platform.get().log("cache corruption", WARN, it)
        }
        requestMethod = source.readUtf8LineStrict()
        val varyHeadersBuilder = Headers.Builder()
        val varyRequestHeaderLineCount = readInt(source)

  - A description of the technical details of the vulnerabilities.
  - A minimal example of the vulnerability. It is very important to let us know
    how we can reproduce your findings. For memory corruption triggerable in
    TensorFlow models, please demonstrate an exploit against one of Alphabet's
    models in <https://tfhub.dev/>
  - An explanation of who can exploit this vulnerability, and what they gain

// missing.  This is identified separately since this may need manual
// inspection to understand the root cause. E.g, this could be due to
// backend filesystem corruption.

// listOnlineDisks - returns
// - a slice of disks where disk having 'older' xl.meta (or nothing)
// are set to nil.
// - latest (in time) of the maximally occurring modTime(s), which has at least quorum occurrences.

        if (!this.useNTSmbs) {
            log.debug("No support for NT SMBs");
        }

        // there seems to be a bug with some servers that causes corruption if using signatures +
        // CAP_LARGE_WRITE
        if (th.hasCapability(SmbConstants.CAP_LARGE_WRITEX) && !th.areSignaturesActive()) {

                        Math.min(th.getConfig().getReceiveBufferSize() - 70, th.areSignaturesActive() ? 0xFFFF - 70 : 0xFFFFFF - 70);
            }

            // there seems to be a bug with some servers that causes corruption if using signatures + CAP_LARGE_WRITE
            if (th.hasCapability(SmbConstants.CAP_LARGE_WRITEX) && !th.areSignaturesActive()) {
                this.writeSize = Math.min(th.getConfig().getSendBufferSize() - 70, 0xFFFF - 70);

    ([CVE-2020-15206](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15206))
*   Fixes a data corruption due to a bug in negative indexing support in TFLite,
    ([CVE-2020-15207](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15207))
*   Fixes a data corruption due to dimension mismatch in TFLite,
    ([CVE-2020-15208](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15208))

of internal (pointer, length) or (pointer, type) pairs,
as can be the case for interface values, maps,
slices, and strings in most Go implementations,
such races can in turn lead to arbitrary memory corruption.
</p>

<p>
Examples of incorrect synchronization are given in the
“Incorrect synchronization” section below.
</p>

<p>
Examples of the limitations on implementations are given in the

	}
	// Corrupt metadata, last 5 bytes is the checksum, so go a bit further back.
	trimmed[len(trimmed)-10] += 10
	if err := xl2.Load(trimmed); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("metadata corruption not detected")
	}
}

// TestUsesDataDir tests xlMetaV2.UsesDataDir
func TestUsesDataDir(t *testing.T) {
	vID := uuid.New()
	dataDir := uuid.New()
	transitioned := make(map[string][]byte)

# See: https://github.com/bazelbuild/bazel/issues/5163
common:windows --features=compiler_param_file

# Use old toolchains for Windows builds.
common:windows --config=clang_local

# Do not risk cache corruption. See:
# https://github.com/bazelbuild/bazel/issues/3360
common:linux --experimental_guard_against_concurrent_changes

# Configure short or long logs
common:short_logs --output_filter=DONT_MATCH_ANYTHING

    deletion immediately, use the `--force` flag. This prevents users from accidentally
    allowing two Stateful Set pods to share the same persistent volume which could lead to data
    corruption [#37263](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/37263)