// Add a bad intermediate CA and have that issue a rogue certificate for localhost. Prepare
    // an SSL context for an attacking webserver. It includes both these rogue certificates plus the
    // trusted good certificate above. The attack is that by including the good certificate in the
    // chain, we may trick the certificate pinner into accepting the rouge certificate.
    val compromisedIntermediateCa =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()

 * `api.publicobject.com` are valid if either A's or B's certificate is in the chain.
 *
 * ## Warning: Certificate Pinning is Dangerous!
 *
 * Pinning certificates limits your server team's abilities to update their TLS certificates. By
 * pinning certificates, you take on additional operational complexity and limit your ability to
 * migrate between certificate authorities. Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of

	}
	today := time.Now()
	expDate, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, cert.ExpirationTime)
	if err != nil {
		log.Errorf("certificate timestamp (%v) could not be parsed: %v", cert.ExpirationTime, err)
		return false
	}
	fromDate, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, cert.ValidFrom)
	if err != nil {
		log.Errorf("certificate timestamp (%v) could not be parsed: %v", cert.ValidFrom, err)
		return false
	}

The TLS Termination Proxy would have access to one or more **TLS certificates** (HTTPS certificates).

Using the **SNI extension** discussed above, the TLS Termination Proxy would check which of the TLS (HTTPS) certificates available it should use for this connection, using the one that matches the domain expected by the client.

In this case, it would use the certificate for `someapp.example.com`.

<img src="/img/deployment/https/https03.svg">

    }
  }

  fun verify(
    host: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean {
    return when {
      host.canParseAsIpAddress() -> verifyIpAddress(host, certificate)
      else -> verifyHostname(host, certificate)
    }
  }

  /** Returns true if [certificate] matches [ipAddress]. */
  private fun verifyIpAddress(
    ipAddress: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean {

CSR, certificates are written to disk and mTLS is used for future requests. If the VM restarted, it would continue
to use the certificates written to disk, assuming the downtime is less than certificate expiration. This is why
the certificates are persisted to disk, rather than kept in memory like in the standard Kubernetes deployment.

## Certificate Rotation

  }

  @Suppress("UNCHECKED_CAST")
  @Throws(SSLPeerUnverifiedException::class)
  override fun getPeerCertificates(): Array<Certificate> {
    return if (certificates.isEmpty()) {
      throw SSLPeerUnverifiedException("peer not authenticated")
    } else {
      certificates as Array<Certificate>
    }
  }

  @Throws(
    SSLPeerUnverifiedException::class,
  )

    val certificate = heldCertificate.certificate
    assertThat(certificate.getSubjectX500Principal().name, "self-signed")
      .isEqualTo(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name)
    assertThat(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name).matches(Regex("CN=[0-9a-f-]{36}"))
    assertThat(certificate.serialNumber).isEqualTo(BigInteger.ONE)
    assertThat(certificate.subjectAlternativeNames).isNull()

	// configured expiry and the duration until the certificate itself
	// expires.
	// We must not issue credentials that out-live the certificate.
	if validUntil := time.Until(certificate.NotAfter); validUntil < expiry {
		expiry = validUntil
	}

	// Associate any service accounts to the certificate CN
	parentUser := "tls" + getKeySeparator() + certificate.Subject.CommonName

      + "0MC2Hb46TpSi125sC8KKfPog88Tk5c0NqMuRkrF8hey1FGlmDoLnzc7ILaZRfyHB\n"
      + "NVOFBkpdn627G190\n"
      + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n");

  final X509Certificate entrustRootCertificateAuthority = Certificates.decodeCertificatePem(""
      + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
      + "MIIEkTCCA3mgAwIBAgIERWtQVDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBsDELMAkGA1UEBhMC\n"