// Add a bad intermediate CA and have that issue a rogue certificate for localhost. Prepare
    // an SSL context for an attacking webserver. It includes both these rogue certificates plus the
    // trusted good certificate above. The attack is that by including the good certificate in the
    // chain, we may trick the certificate pinner into accepting the rouge certificate.
    val compromisedIntermediateCa =
      HeldCertificate

// password protected.
const EnvCertPassword = "MINIO_CERT_PASSWD"

// ParsePublicCertFile - parses public cert into its *x509.Certificate equivalent.
func ParsePublicCertFile(certFile string) (x509Certs []*x509.Certificate, err error) {
	// Read certificate file.
	var data []byte
	if data, err = os.ReadFile(certFile); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Trimming leading and tailing white spaces.

		}
		certificate, err := createTempFile(t, "public.crt", testCase.certificate)
		if err != nil {
			os.Remove(privateKey)
			t.Fatalf("Test %d: failed to create tmp certificate file: %v", i, err)
		}

		if testCase.password != "" {
			t.Setenv(EnvCertPassword, testCase.password)
		}
		_, err = LoadX509KeyPair(certificate, privateKey)
		if err != nil && !testCase.shouldFail {

    val certificate =
      HeldCertificate
        .Builder()
        .keyPair(publicKey, privateKey)
        .build()

    val certificateByteString = certificate.certificate.encoded.toByteString()

    val okHttpCertificate =
      CertificateAdapters.certificate
        .fromDer(certificateByteString)

      }
    }

  fun verify(
    host: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean =
    when {
      host.canParseAsIpAddress() -> verifyIpAddress(host, certificate)
      else -> verifyHostname(host, certificate)
    }

  /** Returns true if [certificate] matches [ipAddress]. */
  private fun verifyIpAddress(
    ipAddress: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean {

        .serialNumber(1L)
        .build()
    val rootB =
      HeldCertificate
        .Builder()
        .serialNumber(2L)
        .build()
    assertThat(get(rootB.certificate, rootA.certificate))
      .isEqualTo(get(rootA.certificate, rootB.certificate))
  }

  @Test
  fun equalsFromTrustManager() {
    val handshakeCertificates = HandshakeCertificates.Builder().build()

on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/5.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but limits your server team’s abilities to update their TLS certificates. **Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of your server’s...

 * certificate is signed by the certificate that follows, and the last certificate is a trusted CA
 * certificate.
 *
 * Use of the chain cleaner is necessary to omit unexpected certificates that aren't relevant to
 * the TLS handshake and to extract the trusted CA certificate for the benefit of certificate
 * pinning.
 */
abstract class CertificateChainCleaner {
  @Throws(SSLPeerUnverifiedException::class)

    throw IllegalArgumentException("failed to decode certificate", nsee)
  } catch (iae: IllegalArgumentException) {
    throw IllegalArgumentException("failed to decode certificate", iae)
  } catch (e: GeneralSecurityException) {
    throw IllegalArgumentException("failed to decode certificate", e)
  }
}

/**
 * Returns the certificate encoded in [PEM format][rfc_7468].
 *

	// configured expiry and the duration until the certificate itself
	// expires.
	// We must not issue credentials that out-live the certificate.
	if validUntil := time.Until(certificate.NotAfter); validUntil < expiry {
		expiry = validUntil
	}

	// Associate any service accounts to the certificate CN
	parentUser := "tls" + getKeySeparator() + certificate.Subject.CommonName