app = FastAPI(dependencies=[Depends(verify_token), Depends(verify_key)])


@app.get("/items/")
async def read_items():
    return [{"item": "Portal Gun"}, {"item": "Plumbus"}]


@app.get("/users/")
async def read_users():

        "price": 42.0,
        "tax": 3.2
    },
    "user": {
        "username": "dave",
        "full_name": "Dave Grohl"
    }
}
```

/// note | 참고

`item`이 이전과 같은 방식으로 선언되었더라도, 이제는 본문에서 `item` 키 안에 있을 것으로 예상된다는 점을 유의하세요.

///

**FastAPI**는 요청에서 자동으로 변환을 수행하여, 매개변수 `item`이 해당하는 내용을 받고 `user`도 마찬가지로 받도록 합니다.

복합 데이터의 검증을 수행하고, OpenAPI 스키마 및 자동 문서에도 그에 맞게 문서화합니다.

}
```

但是你也可以声明多个请求体参数，例如 `item` 和 `user`：

{* ../../docs_src/body_multiple_params/tutorial002_py310.py hl[20] *}

在这种情况下，**FastAPI** 将注意到该函数中有多个请求体参数（两个 Pydantic 模型参数）。

因此，它将使用参数名称作为请求体中的键（字段名称），并期望一个类似于以下内容的请求体：

```JSON
{
    "item": {
        "name": "Foo",
        "description": "The pretender",
        "price": 42.0,
        "tax": 3.2
    },
    "user": {
        "username": "dave",

    return user_id


# Ein Pydantic-Modell
class User(BaseModel):
    id: int
    name: str
    joined: date
```

Das kann nun wie folgt verwendet werden:

```Python
my_user: User = User(id=3, name="John Doe", joined="2018-07-19")

second_user_data = {
    "id": 4,
    "name": "Mary",
    "joined": "2018-11-30",
}

my_second_user: User = User(**second_user_data)
```

/// info | Info

*----+------+------+
| <<<*>>> | Java system properties (see {{{https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/lang/System.html#getProperties()}JDK reference}}) | <<<$\{user.home\}>>>\
 | | <<<$\{java.home\}>>> |
*----+------+------+
| <<<*>>> | User properties | <<<$\{foo\}>>> |
*----+------+------+
| <<<env.*>>>\

            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
            detail="Incorrect username or password",
            headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Basic"},
        )
    return credentials.username


@app.get("/users/me")
def read_current_user(username: str = Depends(get_current_username)):

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6
  - kubelet <= 1.30.2 

 * existing users, but it can't *fix* existing users because any users who needed
 * `Function<@Nullable A, @Nullable B>` already had to find a workaround. Still, there is a *ton* of
 * fallout from trying to switch. I would be shocked if the switch would offer benefits to anywhere
 * near enough users to justify the costs.
 *

    """
    Create an invoice.

    This will (let's imagine) let the API user (some external developer) create an
    invoice.

    And this path operation will:

    * Send the invoice to the client.
    * Collect the money from the client.
    * Send a notification back to the API user (the external developer), as a callback.
        * At this point is that the API will somehow send a POST request to the

     */
    @Pattern(regexp = "[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]T[0-9][0-9]:[0-9][0-9]:[0-9][0-9]")
    public String expires;

    /**
     * The username of the user who created this access token.
     * Maximum length is 1000 characters.
     */
    @Size(max = 1000)
    public String createdBy;

    /**
     * The timestamp when this access token was created.