}

			ns := namespace.NewOrFail(t, t, namespace.Config{Prefix: "grpc-probe", Inject: true})
			// apply strict mtls
			t.ConfigKube(t.Clusters().Configs()...).YAML(ns.Name(), `
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: grpc-probe-mtls
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT`).ApplyOrFail(t)

			for _, testCase := range []struct {
				name     string
				rewrite  bool

) {
	ctx.Helper()
	wantSuccess := rewrite
	policyYAML := fmt.Sprintf(`apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: "mtls-strict-for-%v"
spec:
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: "%v"
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
`, name, name)
	ctx.ConfigIstio().YAML(ns.Name(), policyYAML).ApplyOrFail(ctx)

	var healthcheck echo.Instance
	cfg := echo.Config{
		Namespace: ns,

          "format": "time_series",
          "intervalFactor": 1,
          "legendFormat": "{{ source_workload }}.{{ source_workload_namespace }} : {{ response_code }} (🔐mTLS)",
          "refId": "A",
          "step": 2
        },
        {
          "datasource": {
            "type": "prometheus",
            "uid": "${datasource}"
          },

apiVersion: release-notes/v2
kind: bug-fix
area: security
issue:
- 31297
releaseNotes:
- |

// - The certificate issued by CA to the sidecar is as expected and that strict mTLS works as expected.
// - The plugin CA certs are correctly used in workload mTLS.
// - The CA certificate in the configmap of each namespace is as expected, which
//
//	is used for data plane to control plane TLS authentication.
//
// - Secure naming information is respected in the mTLS handshake.
func TestSecureNaming(t *testing.T) {
	framework.NewTest(t).

			},
			Strict: simulation.Result{
				// TLS, but not mTLS
				Error: simulation.ErrMTLSError,
			},
		},
		{
			Name: "mtls to http",
			Call: simulation.Call{
				Port:     80,
				Protocol: simulation.HTTP,
				TLS:      simulation.MTLS,
				CallMode: simulation.CallModeInbound,
			},
			Disabled: simulation.Result{
				// TLS is not terminated, so we will attempt to decode as HTTP and fail

			Type:        "path",
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         ClientCert,
			Description: `client cert for mTLS authentication` + defaultHelpPostfix(ClientCert),
			Optional:    true,
			Type:        "path",
			Sensitive:   true,
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         ClientCertKey,
			Description: `client cert key for mTLS authentication` + defaultHelpPostfix(ClientCertKey),
			Optional:    true,
			Type:        "path",

		// to handle mTLS vs plaintext and HTTP vs TCP (depending on protocol and PeerAuthentication).
		var opts []FilterChainMatchOptions
		mtls := lb.authnBuilder.ForPort(cc.port.TargetPort)
		// Chain has explicit user TLS config. This can only apply when the TLS mode is DISABLE to avoid conflicts.
		if cc.tlsSettings != nil && mtls.Mode == model.MTLSDisable {

kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
`, nil); err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
	})
	t.Run("invalid", func(t *testing.T) {
		if err := validator.ValidateCustomResourceYAML(`
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: BAD
`, nil); err == nil {
			t.Fatal("expected error but got none")

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: "default"
spec:
  mtls: