* [X-Forwarded-Proto](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Proto)
* [X-Forwarded-Host](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Host)

///

Trotzdem, da der **Anwendungsserver** nicht weiß, dass er sich hinter einem vertrauenswürdigen **Proxy** befindet, würde er diesen Headern standardmäßig nicht vertrauen.

labels.pathmap_pt_stored=Konwersja wyodrębnionego URL
labels.regular_name=Nazwa regularna
labels.duplicate_name=Zduplikowana nazwa
labels.duplicate_host_configuration=Zduplikowany host
labels.duplicate_host_title_details=Zduplikowany host
labels.dashboard_title_configuration=Konfiguracja systemu
labels.dashboard_plugin=Wtyczka pulpitu
labels.web_config_list=Lista konfiguracji web
labels.access_token_details=Access Token Szczegóły

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. true */
    String MAIL_SEND_MOCK = "mail.send.mock";

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. localhost:25 */
    String MAIL_SMTP_SERVER_MAIN_HOST_AND_PORT = "mail.smtp.server.main.host.and.port";

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. [Test] */
    String MAIL_SUBJECT_TEST_PREFIX = "mail.subject.test.prefix";

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. root@localhost */

	opts := &minio.Options{
		Creds:        sts,
		BucketLookup: minio.BucketLookupAuto,
	}

	u, err := url.Parse(stsEndpoint)
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	clnt, err := minio.New(u.Host, opts)
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	d := bytes.NewReader([]byte("Hello, World"))
	n, err := clnt.PutObject(context.Background(), "my-bucketname", "my-objectname", d, d.Size(), minio.PutObjectOptions{})

	}

	// Notify all other MinIO peers to delete policy
	for _, nerr := range globalNotificationSys.DeletePolicy(ctx, policyName) {
		if nerr.Err != nil {
			logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).SetTags("peerAddress", nerr.Host.String())
			iamLogIf(ctx, nerr.Err)
		}
	}

	return nil
}

// InfoPolicy - returns the policy definition with some metadata.

* [X-Forwarded-Proto](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Proto)
* [X-Forwarded-Host](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Host)

///

No entanto, como o servidor de aplicação não sabe que está atrás de um proxy confiável, por padrão ele não confiaria nesses cabeçalhos.

    val call =
      client.newCallWithListener(
        Request
          .Builder()
          .url(
            server
              .url("/")
              .newBuilder()
              .host(ipAddress!!)
              .build(),
          ).build(),
      )
    val response = call.execute()
    assertThat(response.code).isEqualTo(200)
    assertThat(response.body.string()).isEqualTo("abc")

      value = value.trim()

      result.add(
        Cookie
          .Builder()
          .name(name)
          .value(value)
          .domain(url.host)
          .build(),
      )
      pos = pairEnd + 1
    }
    return result
  }

      },
      "favorite_count": {
        "type": "long"
      },
      "filename": {
        "type": "keyword"
      },
      "filetype": {
        "type": "keyword"
      },
      "host": {
        "type": "keyword"
      },
      "lang": {
        "type": "keyword"
      },
      "last_modified": {
        "type": "date",
        "format": "date_optional_time"
      },

* [X-Forwarded-Proto](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Proto)
* [X-Forwarded-Host](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Forwarded-Host)

///

Aun así, como el **servidor de aplicaciones** no sabe que está detrás de un **proxy** de confianza, por defecto, no confiaría en esos headers.