import java.net.UnknownHostException;
import java.util.HashMap;

import jcifs.smb1.Config;
import jcifs.smb1.util.Hexdump;

/**
 * This class represents a NetBIOS over TCP/IP address. Under normal
 * conditions, users of jCIFS need not be concerned with this class as
 * name resolution and session services are handled internally by the smb package.
 *
 * <p> Applications can use the methods <code>getLocalHost</code>,

次の認証情報を使用します：

Username: `johndoe`
Password: `secret`

/// check | 確認

コードのどこにも平文のパスワード"`secret`"はなく、ハッシュ化されたものしかないことを確認してください。

///

<img src="/img/tutorial/security/image08.png">

エンドポイント`/users/me/`を呼び出すと、次のようなレスポンスが得られます：

```JSON
{
  "username": "johndoe",
  "email": "******@****.***",
  "full_name": "John Doe",
  "disabled": false
}
```

 * given at creation time, the natural order of elements is used. If no maximum size is given at
 * creation time, the queue is unbounded.
 *
 * <p>Usage example:
 *
 * {@snippet :
 * MinMaxPriorityQueue<User> users = MinMaxPriorityQueue.orderedBy(userComparator)
 *     .maximumSize(1000)
 *     .create();
 * }
 *
 * <p>As a {@link Queue} it functions exactly as a {@link PriorityQueue}: its head element -- the

        return
    subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "github-actions[bot]"], check=True)
    subprocess.run(
        ["git", "config", "user.email", "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"],
        check=True,
    )
    branch_name = "translate"
    if language:
        branch_name += f"-{language}"
    if command:
        branch_name += f"-{command}"

	if globalMinioEndpoint != "" {
		os.Setenv("CONSOLE_MINIO_SERVER", globalMinioEndpoint)
	} else {
		// Explicitly set 127.0.0.1 so Console will automatically bypass TLS verification to the local S3 API.
		// This will save users from providing a certificate with IP or FQDN SAN that points to the local host.
		os.Setenv("CONSOLE_MINIO_SERVER", fmt.Sprintf("%s://127.0.0.1:%s", getURLScheme(globalIsTLS), globalMinioPort))
	}

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6
  - kubelet <= 1.30.2 

	}, tx.Error)
	tx.Logger = currentLogger
	return
}

// Pluck queries a single column from a model, returning in the slice dest. E.g.:
//
//	var ages []int64
//	db.Model(&users).Pluck("age", &ages)
func (db *DB) Pluck(column string, dest interface{}) (tx *DB) {
	tx = db.getInstance()
	if tx.Statement.Model != nil {
		if tx.Statement.Parse(tx.Statement.Model) == nil {

		h: &Header{
			Name:     "info.txt",
			Mode:     0600,
			Size:     0,
			Uid:      1000,
			Gid:      1000,
			ModTime:  time.Unix(1360602540, 0),
			Uname:    "slartibartfast",
			Gname:    "users",
			Typeflag: TypeReg,
		},
		fm: 0600,
	}}

	for i, v := range vectors {
		fi := v.h.FileInfo()
		h2, err := FileInfoHeader(fi, "")
		if err != nil {
			t.Error(err)
			continue
		}

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6
  - kubelet <= 1.30.2 

adding an OwnerReference

A vulnerability exists in the NodeRestriction admission controller where node users can delete their corresponding node object by patching themselves with an OwnerReference to a cluster-scoped resource. If the OwnerReference resource does not exist or is subsequently deleted, the given node object will be deleted via garbage collection. By default, node users are authorized for create and patch requests but not delete requests against their node object. Since the NodeRestriction...