- [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-14)

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-7)

granting the caller `nodes/proxy` permission in RBAC but that also grants the caller permissions to exec, run and attach to containers on the nodes and doing so does not follow the least privilege principle. Granting callers more permissions than they need can give attackers an opportunity to escalate privileges. ([#126347](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/126347), [@vinayakankugoyal](https://github.com/vinayakankugoyal)) [SIG API Machinery, Auth, Cluster Lifecycle and Node]

###...

   * <p>NOTE: This method is failsafe for security purposes: ALL IPv6 addresses (except localhost
   * (::1)) are hashed to avoid the security risk associated with extracting an embedded IPv4
   * address that might permit elevated privileges.
   *
   * @param ip {@link InetAddress} to "coerce"
   * @return {@link Inet4Address} represented "coerced" address
   * @since 7.0
   */
  public static Inet4Address getCoercedIPv4Address(InetAddress ip) {

	}

	// 3.2 check that user cannot delete the bucket
	err = uClient.RemoveBucket(ctx, bucket)
	if err == nil || err.Error() != "Access Denied." {
		c.Fatalf("User was able to escalate privileges (Err=%v)!", err)
	}
}

func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestAddServiceAccountPerms(c *check) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
	defer cancel()

	// 1. Create a policy

    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind)
    - [Feature](#feature)

		if parentInClaim != parentUser {
			return false
		}
	} else {
		// This is needed so a malicious user cannot
		// use a leaked session key of another user
		// to widen its privileges.
		return false
	}

	isOwnerDerived := parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey

	var err error
	var svcPolicies []string
	roleArn := args.GetRoleArn()

	switch {

  * Stop 'kubectl drain' deleting pods with local storage.
  * Add `kubectl rollout status`
* Security/Auth
  * L7 LB controller and disk attach controllers run on master, so nodes do not need those privileges.
  * Setting TLS1.2 minimum
  * `kubectl create secret tls` command
  * Webhook Token Authenticator
  * **beta** PodSecurityPolicy objects limits use of security-sensitive features by pods.
* Kubectl

        </field>
      </fields>
    </class>
    <class>
      <name>Contributor</name>
      <description>Description of a person who has contributed to the project, but who does not have
        commit privileges. Usually, these contributions come in the form of patches submitted.</description>
      <version>3.0.0+</version>
      <fields>
        <field>
          <name>name</name>
          <version>3.0.0+</version>

- Dockershim security: pod sandbox now always run with `no-new-privileges` and `runtime/default` seccomp profile