assertThat(url.queryParameter("a")).isEqualTo("!$(),/:;?@[]\\^`{|}~")
  }

  /**
   * When callers parse a URL with query components that aren't encoded, we shouldn't convert them
   * into a canonical form because doing so could be semantically different.
   */
  @Test
  fun queryCharactersNotReencodedWhenParsed() {
    val url = parse("http://host/?a=!$(),/:;?@[]\\^`{|}~")

//	}
	PLD	(R1)
	PLD	4(R1)

//
// RET
//
//	LTYPEA cond
//	{
//		outcode($1, $2, &nullgen, 0, &nullgen);
//	}
	BEQ	2(PC)
	RET

// More B/BL cases, and canonical names JMP, CALL.

	BEQ	2(PC)
	B	foo(SB) // JMP foo(SB)
	BL	foo(SB) // CALL foo(SB)
	BEQ	2(PC)
	JMP	foo(SB)
	CALL	foo(SB)

// CMPF and CMPD are special.
	CMPF F1, F2
	CMPD F1, F2

new(Point).SetBytes(decodeHex(tt.encoding)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("error decoding non-canonical point: %v", err) } p2, err := new(Point).SetBytes(decodeHex(tt.canonical)) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("error decoding canonical point: %v", err) } if p1.Equal(p2) != 1 { t.Errorf("equivalent points are not equal: %v, %v", p1, p2) } if encoding := hex.EncodeToString(p1.Bytes()); encoding != tt.canonical { t.Errorf("re-encoding does not match canonical; got %q, expected %q", encoding, tt.canonical) } checkOnCurve(t, p1, p2)...

			} else {
				err = errNoSuchGroup
				return
			}
		} else {
			// We use the group DN returned by the LDAP server (this may not
			// equal the input group name, but we assume it is canonical).
			dn = dnResult.NormDN
		}
		isGroup = true
	}

	// Backward compatibility in detaching non-normalized DNs.
	if !isAttach {
		var oldDN string
		if isGroup {
			oldDN = r.Group

	RET                                        // c0035fd6
	RET R0					   // 00005fd6
	RET R6					   // c0005fd6
	RET R27					   // 60035fd6
	RET R30					   // c0035fd6
	RET	foo(SB)

// B/BL/B.cond cases, and canonical names JMP, CALL.
	BL	1(PC)      // CALL 1(PC)
	BL	(R2)       // CALL (R2)
	BL	foo(SB)    // CALL foo(SB)
	BL	bar<>(SB)  // CALL bar<>(SB)
	B	foo(SB)    // JMP foo(SB)
	BEQ	1(PC)
	BEQ	2(PC)

- Added warnings to the Services API. Kubernetes now warns for Services in the case of:
  - IPv4 addresses with leading zeros
  - IPv6 address in non-canonical format (RFC 5952) ([#114505](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/114505), [@aojea](https://github.com/aojea))

    }

    /**
     * Computes a hashCode for this file based on the URL string and IP
     * address if the server. The hashing function uses the hashcode of the
     * server address, the canonical representation of the URL, and does not
     * compare authentication information. In essence, two
     * <code>SmbFile</code> objects that refer to

on-S3-Sealed-Key":"IAAfALBKUnJKeNPAKw8a/BXzTF16SjXnCB0m/rhsUW7fh5sFzV20DBajo==","X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm":"DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256","content-type":"text/plain"}},{"Bucket":"buck1","Name":"go_113/src/cmd/go/testdata/src/canonical/d/d.go","UserDef":{"X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv":"sLMy8+VOkY5zfdXubr3iDhczlX=","X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-S3-Kms-Key-Id":"my-minio-key","X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-S3-Kms-Sealed-Key":"IAAfAMljQGAC+ET4rjm...

* Use manifest digest (as `docker-pullable://`) as ImageID when available (exposes a canonical, pullable image ID for containers). ([#33014](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/33014), [@DirectXMan12](https://github.com/DirectXMan12))

* fix the error prone account creation method of blob disk ([#59739](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/59739), [@andyzhangx](https://github.com/andyzhangx))
* Get parent dir via canonical absolute path when trying to judge mount-point ([#58433](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/58433), [@yue9944882](https://github.com/yue9944882))