-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#noderestriction). In authentication, we added alpha-level support for automounting improved service account tokens through projected volumes. We also enabled [audience validation in TokenReview](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/generated/kubernetes-api/v1.13/#tokenreview-v1-authentication-k8s-io) for the new tokens for improved scoping. Under audit logging, the new alpha-level "dynamic audit configuration" adds support for [dynamically registering webhooks...

- If BoundServiceAccountTokenVolume is enabled, cluster admins can use metric `serviceaccount_stale_tokens_total` to monitor workloads that are depending on the extended tokens. If there are no such workloads, turn off extended tokens by starting `kube-apiserver` with flag `--service-account-extend-token-expiration=false` ([#96273](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/96273), [@zshihang](https://github.com/zshihang)) [SIG API Machinery and Auth]

	oauth2Token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(ctx, code)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("unable to exchange code for id token: %v", err)
	}

	rawIDToken, ok := oauth2Token.Extra("id_token").(string)
	if !ok {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("id_token not found!")
	}

	// fmt.Printf("TOKEN: %s\n", rawIDToken)
	return rawIDToken, nil
}

// unwrapAll will unwrap the returned error completely.

    /** The key of the message: Target */
    public static final String LABELS_TARGET = "{labels.target}";

    /** The key of the message: Token */
    public static final String LABELS_TOKEN = "{labels.token}";

    /** The key of the message: Synonym File */
    public static final String LABELS_SYNONYM_FILE = "{labels.synonymFile}";

    /** The key of the message: Stopwords File */

	if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode <= 299 {
		// accepted HTTP status codes.
		return nil
	} else if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
		return fmt.Errorf("%s returned '%s', please check if your auth token is correctly set", h.Endpoint(), resp.Status)
	}
	return fmt.Errorf("%s returned '%s', please check your endpoint configuration", h.Endpoint(), resp.Status)
}

				if err != nil {
					continue
				}
				jwtClaims, err = auth.ExtractClaims(cred.SessionToken, secretKey)
			}
			if err != nil {
				// skip this cred - session token seems invalid
				continue
			}

			ldapUsername, okUserN := jwtClaims.Lookup(ldapUserN)
			ldapActualDN, okDN := jwtClaims.Lookup(ldapActualUser)
			if !okUserN || !okDN {

						}
					}

					if testCase.resultL.IsTruncated != resultL.IsTruncated {
						// Allow an extra continuation token.
						if !resultL.IsTruncated || len(resultL.Objects) == 0 {
							t.Errorf("Test %d: %s: Expected IsTruncated flag to be %v, but instead found it to be %v", i+1, instanceType, testCase.resultL.IsTruncated, resultL.IsTruncated)

- Node information is now embedded into Pod-bound service account tokens as additional metadata. The 'JTI' field is set in issued service account tokens, and this information is embedded as `authentication.kubernetes.io/credential-id` in the user's ExtraInfo. ([#123135](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/123135), [@munnerz](https://github.com/munnerz))...

	quarkus/extensions/agroal/deployment/pom.xml
	quarkus/extensions/jdbc/jdbc-h2/deployment/pom.xml
	quarkus/test-framework/junit5-internal/pom.xml
quarkus/extensions/oidc-token-propagation-reactive/deployment/pom.xml
	quarkus/extensions/oidc-token-propagation-reactive/runtime/pom.xml
	quarkus/extensions/security/deployment/pom.xml
	quarkus/extensions/resteasy-reactive/rest-client-reactive/deployment/pom.xml

A maioria dessas configurações é variável (podem mudar), como URLs de bancos de dados. E muitas delas podem conter dados sensíveis, como tokens secretos.

Por isso é comum prover essas configurações como variáveis de ambiente que são utilizidas pela aplicação.

## Variáveis de Ambiente

/// dica