client
        .newCall(request)
        .execute()

    response.use {
      assertEquals(200, response.code)
      assertEquals(Protocol.HTTP_2, response.protocol)
    }

    // Only logs to the test logger above
    // Will fail if "adb shell setprop log.tag.okhttp.Http2 DEBUG" is called
    assertEquals(setOf(OkHttpTest::class.java.name), testHandler.calls.keys)
  }

  fun testCachedRequest() {

	// claim is only considered stable when subject and iss are used together
	// this is to ensure that ParentUser doesn't change and we get to use
	// parentUser as per the requirements for service accounts for OpenID
	// based logins.
	var subFromToken string
	if v, ok := claims[subClaim]; ok {
		subFromToken, _ = v.(string)
	}

	if subFromToken == "" {
		writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,

* **[beta]** Node Problem Detector is beta (v0.3.0) now. New
  features added into node-problem-detector:v0.3.0:
  - Add support for journald.
  - The ability to monitor any system daemon logs. Previously only kernel
    logs were supported.
  - The ability to be deployed and run as a native daemon.
* **[alpha]** Critical Pods: When feature gate "ExperimentalCriticalPodAnnotation" is

* Create a new Deployment in kube-system for every version. ([#23512](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/23512), [@Q-Lee](https://github.com/Q-Lee))
* Use SCP to dump logs and parallelize a bit. ([#22835](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/22835), [@spxtr](https://github.com/spxtr))

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6

- github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang: [1b506fc → v0.9.1](https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang/compare/1b506fc...v0.9.1)
- github.com/sirupsen/logrus: [v1.2.0 → v1.4.2](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus/compare/v1.2.0...v1.4.2)
- github.com/spf13/afero: [b28a7ef → v1.2.2](https://github.com/spf13/afero/compare/b28a7ef...v1.2.2)

import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.UnaryOperator;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;

import org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;
import org.codelibs.core.beans.util.BeanUtil;
import org.codelibs.core.exception.ResourceNotFoundRuntimeException;
import org.codelibs.core.io.FileUtil;
import org.codelibs.core.io.ResourceUtil;

- Kube-apiserver: removed `apf_fd` from server logs which could contain data identifying the requesting user ([#108631](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/108631), [@jupblb](https://github.com/jupblb))

- github.com/rubiojr/go-vhd: [0bfd3b3 → 02e2102](https://github.com/rubiojr/go-vhd/compare/0bfd3b3...02e2102)
- github.com/sirupsen/logrus: [v1.4.2 → v1.6.0](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus/compare/v1.4.2...v1.6.0)
- github.com/spf13/cobra: [v0.0.5 → v1.0.0](https://github.com/spf13/cobra/compare/v0.0.5...v1.0.0)

      if (state != null) {
        // Log before the transition, so that if the process exits in response to server failure,
        // there is a higher likelihood that the cause will be in the logs.
        boolean log = !(service instanceof NoOpService);
        /*
         * We have already exposed startup exceptions to the user in the form of suppressed