}

        return request;
    }

    // layer the creation of a project builder configuration with a request, but this will need to be
    // a Maven subclass because we don't want to couple maven to the project builder which we need to
    // separate.
    protected MavenSession createMavenSession(File pom) throws Exception {
        return createMavenSession(pom, new Properties());
    }

    [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable('PATH', $env:PATH, 'Machine');

# Disable signature checking on pacman because we cannot initialize the keyring.
RUN Add-Content -Path C:\tools\msys64\etc\pacman.d\mirrorlist.mingw32 -Value 'SigLevel = Never'
RUN Add-Content -Path C:\tools\msys64\etc\pacman.d\mirrorlist.mingw64 -Value 'SigLevel = Never'

## Version 4.7.2

_2020-05-20_

 *  Fix: Don't crash inspecting whether the host platform is JVM or Android. With 4.7.0 and 4.7.1 we
    had a crash `IllegalArgumentException: Not a Conscrypt trust manager` because we depended on
    initialization order of companion objects.


## Version 4.7.1

_2020-05-18_

 *  Fix: Pass the right arguments in the trust manager created for `addInsecureHost()`. Without the

	sealedKey.Algorithm = InsecureSealAlgorithm
	if err := key.Unseal(extKey[:], sealedKey, "SSE-S3", "bucket", "object"); err == nil {
		t.Errorf("'%s' test succeeded but it should fail because the legacy algorithm was used", sealedKey.Algorithm)
	}
}

var derivePartKeyTest = []struct {
	PartID  uint32
	PartKey string
}{

     * - A return type is changed for a getter `getX` of an upgraded property
     *
     * We don't automatically accept changes when the @since annotation is missing, because we want to keep this information on the API.
     */
    public static boolean shouldAcceptForUpgradedProperty(JApiMethod jApiMethod, Violation violation, ViolationCheckContext context) {

    }

    /**
     * This constructor used to instance a SigningDigest object for
     * signing/verifying SMB using kerberos session key.
     * The MAC Key = concat(Session Key, Digest of Challenge);
     * Because of Kerberos Authentication don't have challenge,
     * The MAC Key = Session Key
     *
     * @param macSigningKey
     *            The MAC key used to sign or verify SMB.
     */

      /**
       * For whatever reason our BouncyCastle provider doesn't work with ECDSA keys. Just configure it
       * to use RSA-2048 instead.
       *
       * (We otherwise prefer ECDSA because it's faster.)
       */
      private val localhostHandshakeCertificatesWithRsa2048: HandshakeCertificates by lazy {
        val heldCertificate =
          HeldCertificate
            .Builder()

 *
 * b0b1s7 is the section prefix. If a section is omitted, that means its ranges data exactly matches
 * that of the preceding section.
 *
 * b2b3s2 is the offset into the ranges data. It is shifted by 2 because ranges are 4-byte aligned.
 *
 * Mappings Data (4,719 bytes)
 * ===========================
 *
 * This is UTF-8 character data. It is indexed into by b2b3 in the ranges dataset.
 *
 * Mappings may overlap.
 *

        HTTP_TEMP_REDIRECT,
        -> {
          // These codes can only be cached with the right response headers.
          // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234#section-3
          // s-maxage is not checked because OkHttp is a private cache that should ignore s-maxage.
          if (response.header("Expires") == null &&
            response.cacheControl.maxAgeSeconds == -1 &&
            !response.cacheControl.isPublic &&

        // Act
        byte[] r14 = NtlmUtil.getPreNTLMResponse(cifsContext, password14, challenge);
        byte[] r15 = NtlmUtil.getPreNTLMResponse(cifsContext, password15, challenge);

        // Assert: equal because only first 14 OEM bytes are used
        assertArrayEquals(r14, r15, "Only first 14 OEM bytes affect Pre-NTLM response");
        assertEquals(24, r14.length);

        // Verify collaborator interactions