import javax.security.auth.Destroyable;

import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

/**
 * Secure credential storage with encryption at rest.
 *
 * Provides secure storage of passwords and other sensitive credentials
 * using AES-GCM encryption with PBKDF2 key derivation.
 *
 * Features:
 * - Encrypts credentials at rest using AES-256-GCM
 * - Uses PBKDF2 for key derivation from master password

The unified KMS-based approach has several advantages:

- Key management is now centralized. There is one way to change or rotate encryption keys.
   There used to be two different mechanisms - one for regular S3 objects and one for IAM data.
- Reduced server startup time. For IAM encryption with the root credentials, MinIO had
   to use a memory-hard function (Argon2) that (on purpose) consumes a lot of memory and CPU.

    /**
     * Server's time zone offset in minutes from UTC.
     */
    public int serverTimeZone;
    /**
     * Length of the encryption key.
     */
    public int encryptionKeyLength;
    /**
     * Encryption key for password encryption.
     */
    public byte[] encryptionKey;
    /**
     * Server's globally unique identifier.
     */
    public byte[] guid;

			encMetadata[k] = v
		}
	}

	if (sseKMS || sseS3) && r.Encryption.Type == ssekms {
		if err = r.Encryption.Validate(); err != nil {
			return err
		}
		newKeyID = strings.TrimPrefix(r.Encryption.Key, crypto.ARNPrefix)
		newKeyContext = r.Encryption.kmsContext
	}
	if err = rotateKey(ctx, []byte{}, newKeyID, []byte{}, r.Bucket, oi.Name, encMetadata, newKeyContext); err != nil {

src_obj1_etag=$(echo "${stat_out1}" | jq '.etag')
src_obj1_size=$(echo "${stat_out1}" | jq '.size')
src_obj1_md5=$(echo "${stat_out1}" | jq '.metadata."X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key-Md5"')
echo "Stat minio1/test-bucket/defpartsize"
./mc stat --no-list minio1/test-bucket/defpartsize --enc-c "minio1/test-bucket/defpartsize=${TEST_MINIO_ENC_KEY}" --insecure --json

// storage.
type DEK struct {
	KeyID      string // Name of the master key
	Version    int    // Version of the master key (MinKMS only)
	Plaintext  []byte // Paintext of the data encryption key
	Ciphertext []byte // Ciphertext of the data encryption key
}

var (
	_ encoding.TextMarshaler   = (*DEK)(nil)
	_ encoding.TextUnmarshaler = (*DEK)(nil)
)

// MarshalText encodes the DEK's key ID and ciphertext
// as JSON.

/**
 * Utility class for calculating and verifying PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) message authentication codes.
 * This class provides methods for computing MACs using various Kerberos encryption types including
 * ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 and AES-based HMAC algorithms.
 */
public class PacMac {

    /**
     * Private constructor to prevent instantiation of utility class.
     */
    private PacMac() {

// BucketSSEConfig - represents default bucket encryption configuration
type BucketSSEConfig struct {
	XMLNS   string   `xml:"xmlns,attr,omitempty"`
	XMLName xml.Name `xml:"ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration"`
	Rules   []Rule   `xml:"Rule"`
}

// ParseBucketSSEConfig - Decodes given XML to a valid default bucket encryption config
func ParseBucketSSEConfig(r io.Reader) (*BucketSSEConfig, error) {

    @DisplayName("Message constructor should handle crypto-specific error messages")
    @NullAndEmptySource
    @ValueSource(strings = { "AES encryption not supported", "Missing Bouncy Castle provider", "Invalid key length for AES-128",
            "RC4 cipher not available in this JVM", "DES encryption is deprecated and not supported", "HMAC-SHA256 algorithm not found",
            "RSA key generation failed: key size not supported" })

- **Removing a site** is not allowed from a set of replicated sites once configured.
- All sites must be using the **same** external IDP(s) if any.