// There are several well-known algorithms for rotating part of an array (or, equivalently,
    // exchanging two blocks of memory). This classic text by Gries and Mills mentions several:
    // https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/6292/81-452.pdf.
    // (1) "Reversal", the one we have here.
    // (2) "Dolphin". If we're rotating an array a of size n by a distance of d, then element a[0]

      protected String pendingToString() {
        return "task=[" + delegate + "]";
      }
    }
  }

  /*
   * This following method is a modified version of one found in
   * http://gee.cs.oswego.edu/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/jsr166/src/test/tck/AbstractExecutorServiceTest.java?revision=1.30
   * which contained the following notice:
   *
   * Written by Doug Lea with assistance from members of JCP JSR-166 Expert Group and released to

      // But in gcd(a - b, b), a - b is even and b is odd, so we can divide out powers of two.

      // We bend over backwards to avoid branching, adapting a technique from
      // http://graphics.stanford.edu/~seander/bithacks.html#IntegerMinOrMax

      long delta = a - b; // can't overflow, since a and b are nonnegative

      long minDeltaOrZero = delta & (delta >> (Long.SIZE - 1));
      // equivalent to Math.min(delta, 0)

  //    definitely observe all earlier writes, but we still have no guarantee that done() would see
  //    the initial write (just stronger guarantees if it does).
  //
  // See: http://cs.oswego.edu/pipermail/concurrency-interest/2015-January/013800.html
  // For a (long) discussion about this specific issue and the general futility of life.
  //

because it's not adaptive, an // attacker only learns the magnitude of p - q. if diff.BitLenVarTime() <= N.BitLen()/2-100 { return errors.New("crypto/rsa: |p - q| too small") } // Check that d > 2^(nlen/2). // // See section 3 of https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf // for more details about attacks on small d values. // // Likewise, the leakage of the magnitude of d is not adaptive. if priv.d.BitLenVarTime() <= N.BitLen()/2 { return errors.New("crypto/rsa: d too small") } return nil...

because it's not adaptive, an // attacker only learns the magnitude of p - q. if diff.BitLenVarTime() <= N.BitLen()/2-100 { return errors.New("crypto/rsa: |p - q| too small") } // Check that d > 2^(nlen/2). // // See section 3 of https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf // for more details about attacks on small d values. // // Likewise, the leakage of the magnitude of d is not adaptive. if priv.d.BitLenVarTime() <= N.BitLen()/2 { return errors.New("crypto/rsa: d too small") } return nil...