case schema.HasOne, schema.HasMany:
				queryConds := rel.ToQueryConditions(db.Statement.Context, db.Statement.ReflectValue)
				modelValue := reflect.New(rel.FieldSchema.ModelType).Interface()
				tx := db.Session(&gorm.Session{NewDB: true}).Model(modelValue)
				withoutConditions := false
				if db.Statement.Unscoped {
					tx = tx.Unscoped()
				}

				if len(db.Statement.Selects) > 0 {

 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
 */
package jcifs.smb;

/**
 * Handler for SMB session setup operations.
 *
 * This interface defines methods for handling the session
 * setup process in SMB authentication.
 *
 * @author mbechler
 */
public interface SessionSetupHandler {

        mockTransport.capabilities = SmbConstants.CAP_UNICODE | SmbConstants.CAP_NT_SMBS;
        mockTransport.snd_buf_size = 16644;
        mockTransport.maxMpxCount = 50;

        // Configure mock session
        mockSession.transport = mockTransport;

        // Configure authentication - set fields directly since NtlmPasswordAuthentication is final
        mockAuth.username = "testuser";

	DB.Raw("select * from users WHERE id = ?", users[1].ID).First(&user)
	CheckUser(t, user, *users[1])
}

func TestDryRun(t *testing.T) {
	user := *GetUser("dry-run", Config{})

	dryRunDB := DB.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})

	stmt := dryRunDB.Create(&user).Statement
	if stmt.SQL.String() == "" || len(stmt.Vars) != 9 {
		t.Errorf("Failed to generate sql, got %v", stmt.SQL.String())
	}

    int NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL = 0x00000020;

    /**
     * Indicates datagram authentication.
     */
    int NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM_STYLE = 0x00000040;

    /**
     * Indicates that the LAN Manager session key should be used for
     * signing and sealing authenticated communication.
     */
    int NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY = 0x00000080;

    /**
     * ??? According to spec this is a reserved bit and must be set to zero

  }

  internal object DisabledHostnameVerifier : ConscryptHostnameVerifier {
    fun verify(
      hostname: String?,
      session: SSLSession?,
    ): Boolean = true

    override fun verify(
      certs: Array<out X509Certificate>?,
      hostname: String?,
      session: SSLSession?,
    ): Boolean = true
  }

  override fun trustManager(sslSocketFactory: SSLSocketFactory): X509TrustManager? = null

)

type UserWithTable struct {
	gorm.Model
	Name string
}

func (UserWithTable) TableName() string {
	return "gorm.user"
}

func TestTable(t *testing.T) {
	dryDB := DB.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})

	r := dryDB.Table("`user`").Find(&User{}).Statement
	if !regexp.MustCompile("SELECT \\* FROM `user`").MatchString(r.Statement.SQL.String()) {

    }

    /**
     * Test session management thread safety with concurrent operations
     */
    @Test
    public void testSessionManagementConcurrentPerformance() throws Exception {
        SmbTransportImpl mockTransport = Mockito.mock(SmbTransportImpl.class);
        Mockito.when(mockTransport.acquire()).thenReturn(mockTransport);

		t.Fatalf("errors happened when update: %v", err)
	}

	var user3 User
	DB.Preload("Languages").Preload("Friends").Find(&user3, "id = ?", user.ID)
	CheckUser(t, user2, user3)

	if err := DB.Session(&gorm.Session{FullSaveAssociations: true}).Save(&user).Error; err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("errors happened when update: %v", err)
	}

	var user4 User
	DB.Preload("Languages").Preload("Friends").Find(&user4, "id = ?", user.ID)

			// Reject malformed/malicious requests.
			return false
		}
		// The parent claim in the session token should be equal
		// to the parent detected in the backend
		if parentInClaim != parentUser {
			return false
		}
	} else {
		// This is needed so a malicious user cannot
		// use a leaked session key of another user
		// to widen its privileges.
		return false
	}