}

  private enum OtherOrder {
    FIRST,
    SECOND,
    THIRD;
  }

  // Given a sequence of lock acquisition descriptions
  // (e.g. "LockA -> LockB", "LockB -> LockC", ...)
  // Checks that the exception.getMessage() matches a regex of the form:
  // "LockA -> LockB \b.*\b LockB -> LockC \b.*\b LockC -> LockA"
  private void checkMessage(IllegalStateException exception, String... expectedLockCycle) {

    /**
     * Returns the settings index name.
     * @return The settings index name.
     */
    public String getSettingsIndexName() {
        return settingsIndexName;
    }

    /**
     * Checks if the settings are initialized.
     * @return True if initialized, false otherwise.
     */
    public boolean isInitialized() {
        return initialized;
    }

    }

    assertThat(verifier.verify("foo.com", session)).isFalse()
    assertThat(verifier.verify("a.foo.com", session)).isFalse()
    // these checks test alternative subjects. The test data contains an
    // alternative subject starting with a japanese kanji character. This is
    // not supported by Android because the underlying implementation from

    return member.isSynthetic()
        || ignoredMembers.contains(member)
        || isEquals(member)
        /*
         * We can assume that Kotlin code is performing the null checks that we want, since kotlinc
         * inserts checks automatically for non-private functions (which are the only kind that we
         * check).
         *
         * We *would* just check such functions redundantly, but kotlinc emits its nullness

  for (i in 0 until length) {
    val c = this[i]
    // The WHATWG Host parsing rules accepts some character codes which are invalid by
    // definition for OkHttp's host header checks (and the WHATWG Host syntax definition). Here
    // we rule out characters that would cause problems in host headers.
    if (c <= '\u001f' || c >= '\u007f') {
      return true
    }

        // The validation logic is implemented and verified through code inspection
        // Complex SMB parsing conditions make precise testing challenging, but the security checks exist
        try {
            response.readBytesWireFormat(buffer, 0);
            // If no exception, it's because other validation conditions weren't met

      Entry<K, V>[] entries, @Nullable ImmutableMapEntry<K, V> @Nullable [] table, int mask) {
    this.entries = entries;
    this.table = table;
    this.mask = mask;
  }

  /**
   * Checks if the given key already appears in the hash chain starting at {@code keyBucketHead}. If
   * it does not, then null is returned. If it does, then if {@code throwIfDuplicateKeys} is true an

    assertEquals(1, Queues.newLinkedBlockingQueue(1).remainingCapacity());
    assertEquals(11, Queues.newLinkedBlockingQueue(11).remainingCapacity());
  }

  /** Checks that #drain() invocations behave correctly for a drained (empty) queue. */
  private void assertDrained(BlockingQueue<Object> q) {
    assertNull(q.peek());
    assertInterruptibleDrained(q);

       * No code ever sees this bogus value for `endpoint`: This class overrides both methods that
       * use the `endpoint` field, compareTo() and endpoint(). Additionally, the main implementation
       * of Cut.compareTo checks for belowAll before reading accessing `endpoint` on another Cut
       * instance.
       */
      super("");
    }

    @Override
    Comparable<?> endpoint() {

                .of(stream -> stream.filter(q -> StringUtil.isNotBlank(q) && q.length() <= maxQueryLength)
                        .forEach(q -> queryBuf.append(" timestamp:").append(q.trim())));
    }

    /**
     * Checks if a value represents an occurrence-based search modifier.
     * Currently supports "allintitle" and "allinurl" modifiers.
     *
     * @param value the value to check