f[0]),e(f[1])))return c.imageRatioNotAccepted;return!1},a.formUtils.addAsyncValidator({name:"dimension",validatorFunction:function(b,d,e,g,h){if(c){var i=e.get(0).files||[],j=this;e.attr("data-validation").indexOf("mime")===-1?(alert("You should validate file type being jpg, gif or png on input "+e[0].name),b(!1)):i.length>1?(alert("Validating image dimensions does not support inputs allowing multiple files"),b(!1)):0===i.length?b(!0):f(i[0],function(c){var d=!1;e.valAttr("dimension")&&(d=a.form...

///

FastAPI will now:

* **Validate** the data making sure that the max length is 50 characters
* Show a **clear error** for the client when the data is not valid

    .build();
```

Client Authentication
---------------------

The above scenario is representative of most TLS set ups: the client uses certificates to validate
the identity of a server. The converse is also possible. Here we create a server that authenticates
a client and a client that authenticates a server.

```java

  }
  if (remote) {
    TFE_OpSetDevice(matmul, task1_name, status);
    ASSERT_EQ(TF_GetCode(status), TF_OK) << TF_Message(status);
  } else if (!async) {
    // Set the local device to CPU to easily validate mirroring
    string cpu_device_name;
    ASSERT_TRUE(GetDeviceName(ctx, &cpu_device_name, "CPU"));
    TFE_OpSetDevice(matmul, cpu_device_name.c_str(), status);

			if err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
				continue
			}
			// Validate the received bucket policy document
			if err = bucketLifecycle.Validate(rcfg); err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
				continue
			}

			// Validate the transition storage ARNs
			if err = validateTransitionTier(bucketLifecycle); err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)

AssumeRoleWithClientGrants does not require the use of MinIO default credentials. Therefore, client application can be distributed that requests temporary security credentials without including MinIO default credentials. Instead, the identity of the caller is validated by using a JWT access token from the identity provider. The temporary security credentials returned by this API consists of an access key, a secret key, and a security token. Applications can use these temporary security credentials to sign calls...

			[]byte("10000;chunk-signature=ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648    \t \n"),
			[]byte("10000"),
			[]byte("ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648"),
		},
	}
	// Validate chunk extension removal.
	for i, tt := range tests {
		// Extract chunk size and chunk signature after parsing a standard chunk-extension format.
		hexChunkSize, hexChunkSignature := parseS3ChunkExtension(tt.buf)

	if err != nil {
		apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMalformedXML)
		apiErr.Description = err.Error()
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
		return
	}
	// validate the request
	if err := rreq.validate(ctx, objectAPI); err != nil {
		apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMalformedXML)
		apiErr.Description = err.Error()
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
		return
	}

	defer env.LockSetEnv()()

	// Disable merging env values with config for validation.
	env.SetEnvOff()

	// Enable env values to validate KMS.
	defer env.SetEnvOn()
	if subSys != "" {
		return validateSubSysConfig(ctx, s, subSys, objAPI)
	}

	// No sub-system passed. Validate all of them.
	for _, ss := range config.SubSystems.ToSlice() {
		if err := validateSubSysConfig(ctx, s, ss, objAPI); err != nil {
			return err

		err = errors.New("invalid ARN - bad partition field")
		return
	}

	if ps[2] != string(arnServiceIAM) {
		err = errors.New("invalid ARN - bad service field")
		return
	}

	// ps[3] is region and is not validated here. If the region is invalid,
	// the ARN would not match any configured ARNs in the server.
	if ps[4] != "" {
		err = errors.New("invalid ARN - unsupported account-id field")
		return
	}