Exec:                  auths.Exec,
			// Extensions: Not needed,
		}

		// Other relevant fields that are not acted on:
		// * Cluster.Server (and ProxyURL). This allows the user to send requests to arbitrary URLs, enabling potential SSRF attacks.
		//   However, we don't actually know what valid URLs are, so we cannot reasonably constrain this. Instead,

		{"ParseTime", Func, 1},
		{"Post", Func, 0},
		{"PostForm", Func, 0},
		{"ProtocolError", Type, 0},
		{"ProtocolError.ErrorString", Field, 0},
		{"ProxyFromEnvironment", Func, 0},
		{"ProxyURL", Func, 0},
		{"PushOptions", Type, 8},
		{"PushOptions.Header", Field, 8},
		{"PushOptions.Method", Field, 8},
		{"Pusher", Type, 8},
		{"ReadRequest", Func, 0},
		{"ReadResponse", Func, 0},

							Type:        []string{"string"},
							Format:      "byte",
						},
					},
					"proxy-url": {
						SchemaProps: spec.SchemaProps{
							Description: "ProxyURL is the URL to the proxy to be used for all requests to this cluster.",
							Type:        []string{"string"},
							Format:      "",
						},
					},
					"disable-compression": {

pkg net/http, func Post(string, string, io.Reader) (*Response, error)
pkg net/http, func PostForm(string, url.Values) (*Response, error)
pkg net/http, func ProxyFromEnvironment(*Request) (*url.URL, error)
pkg net/http, func ProxyURL(*url.URL) func(*Request) (*url.URL, error)
pkg net/http, func ReadRequest(*bufio.Reader) (*Request, error)
pkg net/http, func ReadResponse(*bufio.Reader, *Request) (*Response, error)