* in the data store plugin directory and extracts component class names.
     *
     * <p>The method uses secure XML parsing features to prevent XXE attacks and
     * other XML-based vulnerabilities. Component class names are extracted from
     * the 'class' attribute of 'component' elements in the XML files.</p>
     *

            final byte[] cmp = new byte[SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
            System.arraycopy(mac.doFinal(), 0, cmp, 0, SIGNATURE_LENGTH);

            // Use constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
            if (!MessageDigest.isEqual(sig, cmp)) {
                return false; // Signature verification failed
            }
            return true; // Signature verification succeeded
        } finally {

      }

    /**
     * Configures this to not authenticate the HTTPS server on to [hostname]. This makes the user
     * vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and should only be used only in private development
     * environments and only to carry test data.
     *
     * The server’s TLS certificate **does not need to be signed** by a trusted certificate

 *
 * Features:
 * - Encrypts credentials at rest using AES-256-GCM
 * - Uses PBKDF2 for key derivation from master password
 * - Secure wiping of sensitive data
 * - Thread-safe operations
 * - Protection against timing attacks
 */
public class SecureCredentialStorage implements AutoCloseable, Destroyable {

    private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(SecureCredentialStorage.class);

            throw new SitemapsException("Could not parse XML Sitemaps.", e);
        }
        return handler.getSitemapSet();
    }

    /**
     * Disables external resources for the SAX parser to prevent XXE attacks.
     * @param parser the SAX parser to configure
     * @throws SAXNotRecognizedException if the parser doesn't recognize the feature
     * @throws SAXNotSupportedException if the parser doesn't support the feature
     */

import java.util.regex.Pattern;

import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

import jcifs.smb.SmbException;

/**
 * Path validation utility to prevent directory traversal and other path-based attacks.
 *
 * Features:
 * - Directory traversal prevention
 * - Path normalization
 * - Blacklist/whitelist support
 * - UNC path validation
 * - Special character filtering
 * - Length validation
 */

/**
 * Security-focused test cases for Smb2NegotiateResponse input validation.
 * Tests various malformed input scenarios to ensure proper validation and
 * protection against buffer overflow, integer overflow, and other attacks.
 */
public class Smb2NegotiateResponseInputValidationTest {

    private Configuration mockConfig;
    private Smb2NegotiateResponse response;

    @BeforeEach
    public void setUp() {

import okio.ByteString
import okio.ByteString.Companion.decodeBase64
import okio.ByteString.Companion.toByteString

/**
 * Constrains which certificates are trusted. Pinning certificates defends against attacks on
 * certificate authorities. It also prevents connections through man-in-the-middle certificate
 * authorities either known or unknown to the application's user.

	"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/mimedb"
	"github.com/pkg/sftp"
	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)

// Maximum write offset for incoming SFTP blocks.
// Set to 100MiB to prevent hostile DOS attacks.
const ftpMaxWriteOffset = 100 << 20

type sftpDriver struct {
	permissions *ssh.Permissions
	endpoint    string
	remoteIP    string
}

//msgp:ignore sftpMetrics
type sftpMetrics struct{}

import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

import jcifs.smb.SmbException;

/**
 * Validator for SMB server responses to prevent buffer overflow and injection attacks.
 *
 * Features:
 * - Buffer bounds checking
 * - Integer overflow prevention
 * - Size validation
 * - Protocol compliance checking
 * - Malformed response detection
 */
public class ServerResponseValidator {