insertIntoDynamicTable(header)
            }
            name.startsWith(Header.PSEUDO_PREFIX) && TARGET_AUTHORITY != name -> {
              // Follow Chromes lead - only include the :authority pseudo header, but exclude all other
              // pseudo headers. Literal Header Field without Indexing - Indexed Name.
              writeInt(headerNameIndex, PREFIX_4_BITS, 0)
              writeByteString(value)

    val request = server.takeRequest()
    assertThat(request.requestLine).isEqualTo("GET /foo HTTP/2")
    assertThat(request.headers[":scheme"]).isEqualTo(scheme)
    assertThat(request.headers[":authority"]).isEqualTo("${server.hostName}:${server.port}")
  }

  @ParameterizedTest
  @ArgumentsSource(ProtocolParamProvider::class)
  fun get204Response(protocol: Protocol) {
    setUp(protocol)

   * signed by the compromised CA's certificate and uses it in a non-CA certificate. They ask the
   * pinned CA above to sign it for non-certificate-authority uses:
   *
   * ```
   *   pinnedRoot (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *     -> pinnedIntermediate (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *         -> attackerSwitch
   * ```
   *

     * @param streamId client-initiated stream ID.  Must be an odd number.
     * @param promisedStreamId server-initiated stream ID.  Must be an even number.
     * @param requestHeaders minimally includes `:method`, `:scheme`, `:authority`, and `:path`.
     */
    @Throws(IOException::class)
    fun pushPromise(
      streamId: Int,
      promisedStreamId: Int,
      requestHeaders: List<Header>,
    )

    /**

and this Alice would not allow without knowing how old it was,
and, as the Lory positively refused to tell its age, there was no
more to be said.

  At last the Mouse, who seemed to be a person of authority among
them, called out, `Sit down, all of you, and listen to me!  I'LL
soon make you dry enough!'  They all sat down at once, in a large
ring, with the Mouse in the middle.  Alice kept her eyes

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6
  - kubelet <= 1.30.2 

**Fixed Versions**:

- The `--certificate-authority` flag now correctly overrides existing skip-TLS or CA data settings in the kubeconfig file ([#83547](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/83547), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))
### Cloud Provider

پاکستان

// xn--mgbai9a5eva00b ("Pakistan", Urdu/Arabic, variant) : PK
پاكستان

// xn--ygbi2ammx ("Falasteen", Arabic) : PS
// The Palestinian National Internet Naming Authority (PNINA)
// http://www.pnina.ps
فلسطين

// xn--90a3ac ("srb", Cyrillic) : RS
// https://www.rnids.rs/en/domains/national-domains
срб
пр.срб
орг.срб
обр.срб
од.срб
упр.срб

- Kubeadm: tolerate whitespace when validating certificate authority PEM data in kubeconfig files ([#86705](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/86705), [@neolit123](https://github.com/neolit123)) [SIG Cluster Lifecycle]

* Resolves x509 verification issue with masters dialing nodes when started with --kubelet-certificate-authority ([#33141](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/33141), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))