# Prevent apt install tzinfo from asking our location (assumes UTC)
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive

# Set up shared custom sources
apt-get update
apt-get install -y gnupg ca-certificates

# Deadsnakes: https://launchpad.net/~deadsnakes/+archive/ubuntu/ppa
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys F23C5A6CF475977595C89F51BA6932366A755776

# LLVM/Clang: https://apt.llvm.org/

    e is InterruptedIOException -> false

    // If the problem was a CertificateException from the X509TrustManager, do not retry.
    e is SSLHandshakeException && e.cause is CertificateException -> false

    // e.g. a certificate pinning error.
    e is SSLPeerUnverifiedException -> false

    // Retry for all other SSL failures.
    e is SSLException -> true

    else -> false

  /**
   * Configure the server to [want client auth][SSLSocket.setWantClientAuth]. If the
   * client presents a certificate that is [trusted][TrustManager] the handshake will
   * proceed normally. The connection will also proceed normally if the client presents no
   * certificate at all! But if the client presents an untrusted certificate the handshake
   * will fail and no connection will be established.
   */
  public fun requestClientAuth() {

pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, ExcludedEmailAddresses []string
pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, ExcludedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, ExcludedURIDomains []string
pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, PermittedEmailAddresses []string
pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, PermittedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
pkg crypto/x509, type Certificate struct, PermittedURIDomains []string

 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
 */
package jcifs.pac;

import jcifs.CIFSException;

/**
 * Exception thrown when PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) data cannot be decoded.
 * Indicates malformed or invalid PAC structures in Kerberos tickets.
 */
public class PACDecodingException extends CIFSException {

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;

- [ ] Make sure that all commits are [signed off](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-commit#Documentation/git-commit.txt---signoff) to indicate that you agree to the terms of [Developer Certificate of Origin](https://developercertificate.org/).

    * Con un componente externo como Certbot para las renovaciones de certificados
* HAProxy
    * Con un componente externo como Certbot para las renovaciones de certificados
* Kubernetes con un Controlador de Ingress como Nginx
    * Con un componente externo como cert-manager para las renovaciones de certificados
* Manejado internamente por un proveedor de nube como parte de sus servicios (lee abajo 👇)

          // TLSv1.2 Events
          // Produced ClientHello handshake message
          // Consuming ServerHello handshake message
          // Consuming server Certificate handshake message
          // Consuming server CertificateStatus handshake message
          // Found trusted certificate
          // Consuming ECDH ServerKeyExchange handshake message
          // Consuming ServerHelloDone handshake message

    enum class Type {
      Handshake,
      Plaintext,
      Encrypted,
      Setup,
      Unknown,
    }

    val type: Type
      get() =
        when {
          message == "adding as trusted certificates" -> Type.Setup
          message == "Raw read" || message == "Raw write" -> Type.Encrypted
          message == "Plaintext before ENCRYPTION" || message == "Plaintext after DECRYPTION" -> Type.Plaintext

previously created the first bootstrap client credentials in the certificates directory as `kubelet-client.key` and `kubelet-client.crt`.  Subsequent certificates created by cert rotation were created in a combined PEM file that was atomically rotated as `kubelet-client-DATE.pem` in that directory, which meant clients relying on the `node.kubeconfig` generated by bootstrapping would never use a rotated cert.  The initial bootstrap certificate is now generated into the cert directory as a PEM file and symlinked...