- Seal the KMS such that it cannot be accessed by MinIO server anymore. That will lock **all** SSE-S3 encrypted objects protected by master keys stored on the KMS. All these objects can not be decrypted as long as the KMS is sealed.

        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
            log.debug("Seal key is " + Hexdump.toHexString(this.sealClientKey));
        }

        this.sealServerKey = deriveKey(mk, S2C_SEAL_CONSTANT);
        this.sealServerHandle = Crypto.getArcfour(this.sealServerKey);

        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
            log.debug("Server seal key is " + Hexdump.toHexString(this.sealServerKey));
        }
    }

          "X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm": "REFSRXYyLUhNQUMtU0hBMjU2",
          "X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv": "bW5YRDhRUGczMVhkc2pJT1V1UVlnbWJBcndIQVhpTUN1dnVBS0QwNUVpaz0=",

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6m:M�MTime�|>���e��MetaSys��6X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm�DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256�&x-minio-internal-replication-timestamp�2023-08-18T00:09:42.389168293Z�#x-minio-internal-replication-status�^arn:minio:replication::36280125-1e9d-414e-bff5-8c88a1b5352e:disney-prod-vod-repository=FAILED;�5X-Minio-Int...

	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	outbuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
	objectKey := crypto.GenerateKey(key.Plaintext, rand.Reader)
	sealedKey := objectKey.Seal(key.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(rand.Reader), crypto.S3.String(), bucket, "")
	crypto.S3.CreateMetadata(metadata, key.KeyID, key.Ciphertext, sealedKey)

			return
		}

		_, sourceReplReq := r.Header[xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest]
		ssecRepHeaders := []string{
			"X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm",
			"X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key",
			"X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv",
		}
		ssecRep := false
		for _, header := range ssecRepHeaders {

	// create xlStorage test setup

.segap-tig,?iab??e!.&noitatsksid,odagod.citsalej,s&nd&ps,uolc,?ppatikria,?ysrab,??g!.&bew?gro?m&aug?oc??ofni?ten?ude?vog???h!.&0002?a&citore?idem?kitore??edszot?gro?ilus?letoh?m&alker?lif?t?urof??naltagni?o&c?ediv?fni?levynok?nisac??pohs?rarga?s&a&kal?zatu??emag?wen??t&lob?rops??virp?xe&s?zs??ytic?zsagoj??os?sut??l!.etisbew321,?m!.&ca?gro?moc?oc?ro?ten?vog???n!.&duolcesirpretne,eni&esrem,m,?tenkcahs,?em!.&enilnoysrab,ysrab,???o&ggnaw?y!c???r!.&3kl,a&i&kymlak,rikhsab,vodrom,?yegyda,?bps,ca,duolcr...

gcmBlockSize = 16 gcmTagSize = 16 gcmMinimumTagSize = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes. gcmStandardNonceSize = 12 ) func (g *GCM) NonceSize() int { return g.nonceSize } func (g *GCM) Overhead() int { return g.tagSize } func (g *GCM) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte { fips140.RecordNonApproved() return g.sealAfterIndicator(dst, nonce, plaintext, data) } func (g *GCM) sealAfterIndicator(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte { if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize { panic("crypto/cipher:...

2F18          ; mapped                 ; 535C          # 3.0  KANGXI RADICAL DIVINATION
2F19          ; mapped                 ; 5369          # 3.0  KANGXI RADICAL SEAL
2F1A          ; mapped                 ; 5382          # 3.0  KANGXI RADICAL CLIFF
2F1B          ; mapped                 ; 53B6          # 3.0  KANGXI RADICAL PRIVATE