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Results 11 - 20 of 43 for malicious (0.37 sec)
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src/syscall/exec_unix.go
// pipe, accept on a socket, and so on. We can't reasonably grab // the lock across those operations. // // It is worse to inherit some file descriptors than others. // If a non-malicious child accidentally inherits an open ordinary file, // that's not a big deal. On the other hand, if a long-lived child // accidentally inherits the write end of a pipe, then the reader
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Feb 26 21:03:59 UTC 2024 - 8.7K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
r *bufio.Reader n uint64 // unread bytes in chunk err error buf [2]byte checkEnd bool // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer excess int64 // "excessive" chunk overhead, for malicious sender detection } func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() { // chunk-size CRLF var line []byte line, cr.err = readChunkLine(cr.r) if cr.err != nil { return }
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Wed Jan 10 03:29:50 UTC 2024 - 7.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
tensorflow/c/experimental/filesystem/modular_filesystem_registration.cc
// TensorFlow will know to not call these on behalf of users; // * increased security as plugins will not be able to alter function table // after loading up. Thus, malicious plugins can't alter functionality to // probe for gadgets inside core TensorFlow. We can even protect the area // of memory where the copies reside to not allow any more writes to it // after all copies are created.
Registered: Sun Jun 16 05:45:23 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Tue Mar 07 22:08:43 UTC 2023 - 12.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
platforms/documentation/docs/src/docs/userguide/dep-man/01-core-dependency-management/dependency_verification.adoc
Dependency verification is about **trust** in what you get and what you ship. Without dependency verification it's easy for an attacker to compromise your supply chain. There are many real world examples of tools compromised by adding a malicious dependency. Dependency verification is meant to protect yourself from those attacks, by forcing you to ensure that the artifacts you include in your build are the ones that you expect.
Registered: Wed Jun 12 18:38:38 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Wed Feb 07 20:36:31 UTC 2024 - 56.7K bytes - Viewed (0) -
staging/src/k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/server/secure_serving.go
if s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection > 0 { http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = uint32(s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection) } else { // match http2.initialMaxConcurrentStreams used by clients // this makes it so that a malicious client can only open 400 streams before we forcibly close the connection // https://github.com/golang/net/commit/b225e7ca6dde1ef5a5ae5ce922861bda011cfabd http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = 100 }
Registered: Sat Jun 15 01:39:40 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu Oct 12 20:54:07 UTC 2023 - 10.3K bytes - Viewed (0) -
cmd/iam.go
if ok { parentInClaim, ok := p.(string) if !ok { // Reject malformed/malicious requests. return false } // The parent claim in the session token should be equal // to the parent detected in the backend if parentInClaim != parentUser { return false } } else { // This is needed so a malicious user cannot // use a leaked session key of another user // to widen its privileges.
Registered: Sun Jun 16 00:44:34 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu Jun 13 22:26:38 UTC 2024 - 71.9K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/mime/multipart/multipart.go
Package multipart implements MIME multipart parsing, as defined in RFC 2046. The implementation is sufficient for HTTP (RFC 2388) and the multipart bodies generated by popular browsers. # Limits To protect against malicious inputs, this package sets limits on the size of the MIME data it processes. [Reader.NextPart] and [Reader.NextRawPart] limit the number of headers in a
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu Mar 21 16:12:35 UTC 2024 - 14.1K bytes - Viewed (0) -
pkg/xds/server.go
TotalXDSInternalErrors.Increment() return } // This should be only set for the first request. The node id may not be set - for example malicious clients. if firstRequest { // probe happens before envoy sends first xDS request if req.TypeUrl == model.HealthInfoType {
Registered: Fri Jun 14 15:00:06 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon May 13 20:55:20 UTC 2024 - 16.3K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/cmd/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/note/note.go
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown key %s+%08x", e.Name, e.KeyHash) } // An ambiguousVerifierError indicates that the given name and hash // match multiple keys passed to [VerifierList]. // (If this happens, some malicious actor has taken control of the // verifier list, at which point we may as well give up entirely, // but we diagnose the problem instead.) type ambiguousVerifierError struct { name string hash uint32 }
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Wed Jul 12 20:38:21 UTC 2023 - 20.1K bytes - Viewed (0) -
platforms/documentation/docs/src/docs/userguide/reference/gradle_wrapper.adoc
As with all such files, you should ensure it's trustworthy before executing it. Since the Wrapper JAR is usually checked into a project's version control system, there is the potential for a malicious actor to replace the original JAR with a modified one by submitting a pull request that only upgrades the Gradle version.
Registered: Wed Jun 12 18:38:38 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Mar 04 16:15:50 UTC 2024 - 20.7K bytes - Viewed (0)