import java.security.MessageDigest;

/**
 * This is an implementation of the HMACT64 keyed hashing algorithm.
 * HMACT64 is defined by Luke Leighton as a modified HMAC-MD5 (RFC 2104)
 * in which the key is truncated at 64 bytes (rather than being hashed
 * via MD5).
 */
class HMACT64 extends MessageDigest implements Cloneable {

    private static final int BLOCK_LENGTH = 64;

    private static final byte IPAD = (byte) 0x36;

    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2000 OK")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 two OK")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2000")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 two")
  }

  @Test
  fun truncated() {
    assertInvalid("")
    assertInvalid("H")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 ")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2")

            // Challenge bytes would be at 24-31 but we're truncated

            // When & Then
            assertThrows(ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException.class, () -> new Type2Message(truncatedMessage));
        }

        @Test
        @DisplayName("parse should handle truncated message missing target info")
        void testParse_InputLengthTooSmallForTargetInfo() {
            // Given

        }
      }
    }

  override fun peekTrailers(): Headers? {
    if (trailers === TRAILERS_RESPONSE_BODY_TRUNCATED) {
      throw IOException("Trailers cannot be read because the response body was truncated")
    }
    check(state == STATE_READING_RESPONSE_BODY || state == STATE_CLOSED) {
      "Trailers cannot be read because the state is $state"
    }
    return trailers
  }

        byte[] trunc = new byte[8];
        System.arraycopy(dgst, 0, trunc, 0, 8);

        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
            log.debug("Digest " + Hexdump.toHexString(dgst));
            log.debug("Truncated " + Hexdump.toHexString(trunc));
        }

        if ((this.ntlmsspFlags & NtlmFlags.NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) != 0) {
            try {
                trunc = this.sealClientHandle.doFinal(trunc);

              rangeToRemove.upperBound,
              rangeMapEntry.getUpperBound(),
              mapEntryBelowToTruncate.getValue().getValue());
        }
        // overwrite mapEntryToTruncateBelow with a truncated range
        putRangeMapEntry(
            rangeMapEntry.getLowerBound(),
            rangeToRemove.lowerBound,
            mapEntryBelowToTruncate.getValue().getValue());
      }
    }

        return this.hexCode;
    }

    /**
     * Constructs a NetBIOS name with the specified parameters.
     *
     * @param cfg the configuration to use
     * @param name the NetBIOS name (will be truncated to 15 characters if longer)
     * @param hexCode the NetBIOS name type code
     * @param scope the NetBIOS scope identifier
     */
    public Name(final Configuration cfg, String name, final int hexCode, final String scope) {

                      */

    Name() {
    }

    /**
     * Creates a NetBIOS name with the specified attributes.
     *
     * @param name the NetBIOS name (will be truncated to 15 characters if longer)
     * @param hexCode the NetBIOS name type/suffix
     * @param scope the NetBIOS scope identifier (uses default if null or empty)
     */

     * @param usage the Kerberos key usage number for this operation
     * @param baseKey the base Kerberos key for key derivation
     * @param input the data to calculate the MAC for
     * @return the calculated MAC bytes (truncated to 12 bytes)
     * @throws GeneralSecurityException if cryptographic operations fail
     */
    public static byte[] calculateMacHMACAES(int usage, KerberosKey baseKey, byte[] input) throws GeneralSecurityException {

    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("byte[] ctor: malformed DER is wrapped as PACDecodingException (IOException path)")
    void byteArrayConstructor_malformedDER_throwsWrapped() {
        // Arrange: Truncated SEQUENCE (0x30 len=2 but only 1 byte of content)
        byte[] malformed = new byte[] { 0x30, 0x02, 0x01 };

        // Act + Assert