* It supports password-protected PDFs and can extract embedded documents and annotations.
 *
 * <p>The extractor runs text extraction in a separate thread with a configurable timeout
 * to prevent hanging on problematic PDF files. It also extracts metadata from the PDF
 * document and includes it in the extraction result.
 *
 * <p>Features:
 * <ul>
 *   <li>Text extraction from PDF pages</li>

 *
 * See [RFC 7234, 5.2](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234#section-5.2).
 */
class CacheControl internal constructor(
  /**
   * In a response, this field's name "no-cache" is misleading. It doesn't prevent us from caching
   * the response; it only means we have to validate the response with the origin server before
   * returning it. We can do this with a conditional GET.
   *

 *
 * @author mbechler
 *
 */
public final class SmbCopyUtil {

    private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(SmbCopyUtil.class);

    /**
     * Private constructor to prevent instantiation of utility class.
     */
    private SmbCopyUtil() {
    }

    /**
     * @param dest
     * @return
     * @throws SmbException
     * @throws SmbAuthException
     */

            throw new SitemapsException("Could not parse XML Sitemaps.", e);
        }
        return handler.getSitemapSet();
    }

    /**
     * Disables external resources for the SAX parser to prevent XXE attacks.
     * @param parser the SAX parser to configure
     * @throws SAXNotRecognizedException if the parser doesn't recognize the feature
     * @throws SAXNotSupportedException if the parser doesn't support the feature

import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;

import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

import jcifs.smb.SmbException;

/**
 * Path validation utility to prevent directory traversal and other path-based attacks.
 *
 * Features:
 * - Directory traversal prevention
 * - Path normalization
 * - Blacklist/whitelist support
 * - UNC path validation
 * - Special character filtering

            log.error("Error during file handle finalization", e);
        } finally {
            super.finalize();
        }
    }

    /**
     * Emergency cleanup method to prevent resource leaks during finalization
     */
    private void emergencyCloseHandle() {
        try {
            synchronized (this) {
                // Force close the handle
                this.open = false;

    /**
     * Determine optimal polling interval based on directory activity and failure count
     *
     * Current strategy is based on failure count. In the future, this could be enhanced to consider:
     * - Recent event frequency (successful notifications)
     * - Time since last successful notification
     * - Events per unit time for more adaptive behavior
     *
     * @param handle notification handle

    * In order to remain backwards compatible, the new controller...

    /** Constant value representing Docker application type */
    private static final String FESS_APP_DOCKER = "docker";

    /**
     * Protected constructor to prevent instantiation of this utility class.
     * This class is designed to be used statically.
     */
    protected ResourceUtil() {
        // nothing
    }

    /**

        });

        assertTrue(exception.getMessage().contains("Invalid negotiate context count: 65535"));
    }

    /**
     * Test validation of excessive buffer sizes to prevent resource exhaustion.
     */
    @Test
    public void testExcessiveBufferSizes() {
        byte[] buffer = createBasicNegotiateResponseBuffer();

        // Test excessive maxTransactSize (> 16MB)