// we try hard to make them robust in practice.  We could additionally try to add in a system
    // load timeout multiplier.  Or we could try to use a CPU time bound instead of wall clock time
    // bound.  But these ideas are harder to implement.  We do not try to detect or handle a
    // user-specified -XX:+DisableExplicitGC.
    //
    // TODO(user): Consider using

    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test decode with maximum file name length")
    void testDecodeMaxFileNameLength() throws SMBProtocolDecodingException {
        // Create a very long filename (but within reasonable bounds)
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
        for (int i = 0; i < 255; i++) {
            sb.append('A');
        }
        String longFileName = sb.toString();

        assertTrue(shorter.equals(longer), "Shorter equals longer when prefix matches (implementation behavior)");

        // In the opposite direction, an out-of-bounds occurs internally and is caught as false
        assertFalse(longer.equals(shorter), "Longer does not equal shorter (implementation behavior)");
    }

    // Confirms equals() returns false when content differs

				return
			}
		default:
			bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
			if err != nil {
				err = msgp.WrapError(err)
				return
			}
		}
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z RStat) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = 1 + 6 + msgp.Int64Size + 6 + msgp.Int64Size
	return
}

// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable

 *
 * Features:
 * - Structured JSON logging
 * - Sensitive data masking
 * - Event categorization
 * - Performance metrics
 * - Compliance-ready audit trail
 * - Asynchronous logging with bounded queue
 * - Object pooling to reduce GC pressure
 */
public class SecurityAuditLogger {

    private static final Logger auditLog = LoggerFactory.getLogger("SECURITY.AUDIT");

    `SparseDenseCwiseMul`
    ([CVE-2021-29567](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-29567))
*   Fixes a heap out of bounds read in `MaxPoolGradWithArgmax`
    ([CVE-2021-29570](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-29570))
*   Fixes a heap out of bounds read in `RequantizationRange`
    ([CVE-2021-29569](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-29569))

  a offline status parameter which is used when retrieving the specific Wagon.

  If <<<offline == true>>>:

  * If the wagon is not bound to "file://", then ignore the request and print
    a debug message.

  * If the wagon is bound to "file://" then:

    Retrieve the file or base-url file to be "downloaded".

    * If the file (or more usefully, the base-url file) exists, proceed.

            )
            assertHasNoWarning()
            assertHasNoInformation()
        }
    }

    @Test
    fun `from null class type argument bound to non-null might be breaking`() {

        checkNotBinaryCompatibleJava(
            v1 = """
                import java.util.List;
                import $nullableAnnotationName;

## Version 1.0.2

_2013-05-11_

 * Fix: Remove use of Java 6-only APIs.
 * Fix: Properly handle exceptions from `NetworkInterface` when querying MTU.
 * Fix: Ensure MTU has a reasonable default and upper-bound.


## Version 1.0.1

_2013-05-06_

 * Correct casing of SSL in method names (`getSslSocketFactory`/`setSslSocketFactory`).


## Version 1.0.0

_2013-05-06_

				return
			}
		default:
			bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
			if err != nil {
				err = msgp.WrapError(err)
				return
			}
		}
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *SiteResyncStatus) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = 1 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + z.Status.Msgsize() + 4 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.DeplID) + 5 + msgp.MapHeaderSize