t.Errorf("Test %d: Parsed Signature field mismatch: Expected \"%s\", got \"%s\"", i+1, testCase.expectedAuthField.Signature, parsedAuthField.Signature)
			}

			// validating the extracted signed headers.
			if strings.Join(testCase.expectedAuthField.SignedHeaders, ",") != strings.Join(parsedAuthField.SignedHeaders, ",") {

  }

  fun readLong(): Long {
    if (bytesLeft !in 1..8) throw ProtocolException("unexpected length: $bytesLeft at $this")

    var result = source.readByte().toLong() // No "and 0xff" because this is a signed value!
    while (byteCount < limit) {
      result = result shl 8
      result += source.readByte().toInt() and 0xff
    }
    return result
  }

  fun readBitString(): BitString {

certificate authority attacks such as the [2011 DigiNotar attack](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2510951/cybercrime-hacking/hackers-spied-on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/4.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but...

				"X-Amz-Content-Sha256": payloadSHA256,
			},
			region:   "us-west-1",
			expected: ErrUnsignedHeaders,
		},
		// (3) Should fail to extract headers if the host header is not signed.
		{
			queryParams: map[string]string{
				"X-Amz-Algorithm":      signV4Algorithm,
				"X-Amz-Date":           now.Format(iso8601Format),
				"X-Amz-Expires":        "60",

  internal var allocationLimit = 1
    private set

  /** Current calls carried by this connection. */
  val calls = mutableListOf<Reference<RealCall>>()

  /** Timestamp when `allocations.size()` reached zero. Also assigned upon initial connection. */
  var idleAtNs = Long.MAX_VALUE

  /**
   * Returns true if this is an HTTP/2 connection. Such connections can be used in multiple HTTP
   * requests simultaneously.
   */

`RoleArn` API request parameter in the STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity API call. When using Role Policies, multiple OpenID providers and/or client applications (with unique client IDs) may be configured with independent role policies. Each configuration is assigned a unique RoleARN by the MinIO server and this is used to select the policies to apply to temporary credentials generated in the AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity call.

2. `id_token` claims: When the role policy is not configured, MinIO looks for...

    val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
    val heldCertificate = HeldCertificate.Builder().build()
    val certificate = heldCertificate.certificate
    assertThat(certificate.getSubjectX500Principal().name, "self-signed")
      .isEqualTo(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name)
    assertThat(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name).matches(Regex("CN=[0-9a-f-]{36}"))
    assertThat(certificate.serialNumber).isEqualTo(BigInteger.ONE)

}

func getReqAccessKeyV2(r *http.Request) (auth.Credentials, bool, APIErrorCode) {
	if accessKey := r.Form.Get(xhttp.AmzAccessKeyID); accessKey != "" {
		return checkKeyValid(r, accessKey)
	}

	// below is V2 Signed Auth header format, splitting on `space` (after the `AWS` string).
	// Authorization = "AWS" + " " + AWSAccessKeyId + ":" + Signature
	authFields := strings.Split(r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization), " ")
	if len(authFields) != 2 {

```

It is not encrypted, so, anyone could recover the information from the contents.

But it's signed. So, when you receive a token that you emitted, you can verify that you actually emitted it.

  // 'inputFuture'. That field is non-final and non-volatile. There are 2 places where the
  // 'inputFuture' field is read and where we will have to consider visibility of the write
  // operation in the constructor.
  //
  // 1. In the listener that performs the callback. In this case it is fine since inputFuture is