byte[] trunc = new byte[8];
        System.arraycopy(dgst, 0, trunc, 0, 8);

        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
            log.debug("Digest " + Hexdump.toHexString(dgst));
            log.debug("Truncated " + Hexdump.toHexString(trunc));
        }

        if ((this.ntlmsspFlags & NtlmFlags.NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) != 0) {
            try {
                trunc = this.sealClientHandle.doFinal(trunc);

        }
      }
    }

  override fun peekTrailers(): Headers? {
    if (trailers === TRAILERS_RESPONSE_BODY_TRUNCATED) {
      throw IOException("Trailers cannot be read because the response body was truncated")
    }
    check(state == STATE_READING_RESPONSE_BODY || state == STATE_CLOSED) {
      "Trailers cannot be read because the state is $state"
    }
    return trailers
  }

    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2000 OK")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 two OK")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2000")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 two")
  }

  @Test
  fun truncated() {
    assertInvalid("")
    assertInvalid("H")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 ")
    assertInvalid("HTTP/1.1 2")

          f'{url}\n\n')
      failure_msg += (
          f'Here\'s a fragment of the log containing the failure:\n\n'
          f'[ ... TRUNCATED ... ]\n\n'
          f'{invocation_results["log_fragment"]}\n'
          f'\n[ ... TRUNCATED ... ]\n'
      )
      failure = ElemTree.SubElement(
          testcase, elem_name,
          message=f'Bazel invocation {invocation_id} failed.')

        });

        assertEquals("Invalid avLen for AvEOL", exception.getMessage(), "Should throw exception for invalid EOL");
    }

    /**
     * Test decode with truncated data
     */
    @Test
    @DisplayName("Decode should handle truncated data")
    void testDecodeTruncatedData() {
        byte[] truncatedData = new byte[3]; // Less than 4 bytes

import java.security.MessageDigest;

/**
 * This is an implementation of the HMACT64 keyed hashing algorithm.
 * HMACT64 is defined by Luke Leighton as a modified HMAC-MD5 (RFC 2104)
 * in which the key is truncated at 64 bytes (rather than being hashed
 * via MD5).
 */
public class HMACT64 extends MessageDigest implements Cloneable {

    private static final int BLOCK_LENGTH = 64;

import java.security.MessageDigest;

/**
 * This is an implementation of the HMACT64 keyed hashing algorithm.
 * HMACT64 is defined by Luke Leighton as a modified HMAC-MD5 (RFC 2104)
 * in which the key is truncated at 64 bytes (rather than being hashed
 * via MD5).
 */
class HMACT64 extends MessageDigest implements Cloneable {

    private static final int BLOCK_LENGTH = 64;

    private static final byte IPAD = (byte) 0x36;

  }

  private int nextRandomKey() {
    int a = random.nextInt(max);

    /*
     * For example, if concentration=2.0, the following takes the square root of
     * the uniformly-distributed random integer, then truncates any fractional
     * part, so higher integers would appear (in this case linearly) more often
     * than lower ones.
     */
    return (int) Math.pow(a, 1.0 / concentration);
  }

  @AfterExperiment

            // Challenge bytes would be at 24-31 but we're truncated

            // When & Then
            assertThrows(ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException.class, () -> new Type2Message(truncatedMessage));
        }

        @Test
        @DisplayName("parse should handle truncated message missing target info")
        void testParse_InputLengthTooSmallForTargetInfo() {
            // Given

              rangeToRemove.upperBound,
              rangeMapEntry.getUpperBound(),
              mapEntryBelowToTruncate.getValue().getValue());
        }
        // overwrite mapEntryToTruncateBelow with a truncated range
        putRangeMapEntry(
            rangeMapEntry.getLowerBound(),
            rangeToRemove.lowerBound,
            mapEntryBelowToTruncate.getValue().getValue());
      }
    }