If any provision of this Agreement is invalid or unenforceable under
applicable law, it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of
the remainder of the terms of this Agreement, and without further
action by the parties hereto, such provision shall be reformed to the
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.

If Recipient institutes patent litigation against any entity

	racereleaseg(sg.g, chanbuf(c, 0))
	raceacquire(chanbuf(c, 0))
}

// Notify the race detector of a send or receive involving buffer entry idx
// and a channel c or its communicating partner sg.
// This function handles the special case of c.elemsize==0.
func racenotify(c *hchan, idx uint, sg *sudog) {
	// We could have passed the unsafe.Pointer corresponding to entry idx

			q.Activate(logger, map[string]*v1.Pod{"test_pod": tt.qPodInfoToActivate.PodInfo.Pod})

			// Check the result after activation by the length of activeQ
			if wantLen := len(tt.want); q.activeQ.Len() != wantLen {
				t.Errorf("length compare: want %v, got %v", wantLen, q.activeQ.Len())
			}

			// Check if the specific pod exists in activeQ
			for _, want := range tt.want {

			// since Closing this early in the loop would risk
			// making connections be re-used for the wrong reason.
			defer res.Body.Close()

			if res.ContentLength != int64(wantLen) {
				t.Errorf("%s res.ContentLength = %d; want %d", path, res.ContentLength, wantLen)
			}
			got, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
			if string(got) != msg || err != nil {
				t.Errorf("%s ReadAll(Body) = %q, %v; want %q, nil", path, string(got), err, msg)
			}

	case ir.OSLICE2ARRPTR:
		// if arrlen > slice.len {
		//   panic(...)
		// }
		// slice.ptr
		n := n.(*ir.ConvExpr)
		v := s.expr(n.X)
		nelem := n.Type().Elem().NumElem()
		arrlen := s.constInt(types.Types[types.TINT], nelem)
		cap := s.newValue1(ssa.OpSliceLen, types.Types[types.TINT], v)
		s.boundsCheck(arrlen, cap, ssa.BoundsConvert, false)
		op := ssa.OpSlicePtr

			// (Section 5.4.1) of type INADEQUATE_SECURITY if one of
			// the prohibited cipher suites are negotiated."
			//
			// We choose that. In my opinion, the spec is weak
			// here. It also says both parties must support at least
			// TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 so there's no
			// excuses here. If we really must, we could allow an
			// "AllowInsecureWeakCiphers" option on the server later.