- path: "annotations"
          fieldRef:
            fieldPath: metadata.annotations
  - name: istio-token
    projected:
      sources:
      - serviceAccountToken:
          path: istio-token
          expirationSeconds: 43200
          audience: {{ .Values.global.sds.token.aud }}
  {{- if eq .Values.global.pilotCertProvider "istiod" }}
  - name: istiod-ca-cert
    configMap:

	clusterStatus         string
	listenerStatus        string
	routeStatus           string
	endpointStatus        string
	extensionconfigStatus string
}

const ignoredStatus = "IGNORED"

// PrintAll takes a slice of Istiod syncz responses and outputs them using a tabwriter
func (s *XdsStatusWriter) PrintAll(statuses map[string]*discovery.DiscoveryResponse) error {
	w, fullStatus, err := s.setupStatusPrint(statuses)
	if err != nil {

	// within all pods as we do on the host.
	//
	// This should be fine, as the host binaries are all we have to work with here anyway,
	// as we are running within a privileged container - and we don't want to take the time to
	// redetect for each pod anyway.
	//
	// Extreme corner case:
	// If for some reason your host had both binaries, and you were injecting out-of-band

topologies mix and match these two.

For a standard Kubernetes deployment, both CA and discovery will use JWT authentication, with a token automatically
[generated and rotated by Kubernetes](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/#service-account-token-volume-projection).

For discovery, the JWT token will be read directly from a file and sent as is. For CA, this logic is a bit more complex,

contexts:
- context:
    cluster: local
    user: istio-cni
  name: istio-cni-context
current-context: istio-cni-context
kind: Config
preferences: {}
users:
- name: istio-cni
  user:

    pilotCertProvider: istiod
    sds:
      # The JWT token for SDS and the aud field of such JWT. See RFC 7519, section 4.1.3.
      # When a CSR is sent from Istio Agent to the CA (e.g. Istiod), this aud is to make sure the
      # JWT is intended for the CA.
      token:
        aud: istio-ca
    sts:
      # The service port used by Security Token Service (STS) server to handle token exchange requests.

		Workload: podToWorkload(pod),
		Netns:    ns,
	}
	netns1 := p.UpsertPodCacheWithNetns(string(pod.UID), wl)
	netnsTaken := p.Take(string(pod.UID))
	if netns1 != netnsTaken {
		t.Fatalf("Expected the original Netns for the same uid, got %p and %p", netns1, ns)
	}
	if nil != p.Take(string(pod.UID)) {
		// expect nil because we already took it
		t.Fatalf("Expected nil Netns for the same uid twice")
	}
}

    repair:
      enabled: true
      hub: ""
      tag: ""

      # Repair controller has 3 modes. Pick which one meets your use cases. Note only one may be used.
      # This defines the action the controller will take when a pod is detected as broken.

      # labelPods will label all pods with <brokenPodLabelKey>=<brokenPodLabelValue>.

#### Caching

Config translation typically takes the overwhelming majority of Istiod's resource usage. In particular, protobuf encoding. As a result, caching has been introduced, storing the already encoded `protobuf.Any` for a given resource.

  // respond with a 410 ResourceExpired error together with a continue token. If the client needs a
  // consistent list, it must restart their list without the continue field. Otherwise, the client may
  // send another list request with the token received with the 410 error, the server will respond with