}

func (m *GroupResource) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
	i := len(dAtA)
	_ = i
	var l int
	_ = l
	i -= len(m.Resource)
	copy(dAtA[i:], m.Resource)
	i = encodeVarintGenerated(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Resource)))
	i--
	dAtA[i] = 0x12
	i -= len(m.Group)
	copy(dAtA[i:], m.Group)
	i = encodeVarintGenerated(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Group)))
	i--
	dAtA[i] = 0xa

- IngressClass resource can now reference a resource in a specific namespace 
  for implementation-specific configuration (previously only Cluster-level resources were allowed). 

			if postIndex < 0 {
				return ErrInvalidLengthGenerated
			}
			if postIndex > l {
				return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
			}
			if m.Resource == nil {
				m.Resource = &v11.TypedLocalObjectReference{}
			}
			if err := m.Resource.Unmarshal(dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]); err != nil {
				return err
			}
			iNdEx = postIndex
		default:
			iNdEx = preIndex

- Log messages and metrics for the watch cache are now keyed by `<resource>.<group>` instead of `go` struct type. This means e.g. that `*v1.Pod` becomes `pods`. Additionally, resources that come from `CustomResourceDefinitions` are displayed as the correct resource and group, instead of `*unstructured.Unstructured`. ([#111807](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/111807), [@ncdc](https://github.com/ncdc))...

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

limitations under the License.
*/

// Code generated by conversion-gen. DO NOT EDIT.

package v1

import (
	url "net/url"
	unsafe "unsafe"

	v1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
	resource "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/resource"
	metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
	conversion "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/conversion"
	runtime "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/runtime"
	types "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/types"

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

    <sub-class-of type="text/plain"/>
    <glob pattern="*.rnc"/>
  </mime-type>
  <mime-type type="application/remote-printing"/>
  <mime-type type="application/resource-lists+xml">
    <glob pattern="*.rl"/>
  </mime-type>
  <mime-type type="application/resource-lists-diff+xml">
    <glob pattern="*.rld"/>
  </mime-type>
  <mime-type type="application/riscos"/>
  <mime-type type="application/rlmi+xml"/>

Additionally, a background task is normally an independent set of logic that should be handled separately, with its own resources (e.g. its own database connection).

	etcdStorage, server := registrytest.NewEtcdStorage(t, "")
	restOptions := generic.RESTOptions{
		StorageConfig:           etcdStorage.ForResource(schema.GroupResource{Resource: "services"}),
		Decorator:               generic.UndecoratedStorage,
		DeleteCollectionWorkers: 1,
		ResourcePrefix:          "services",
	}

	ipAllocs := map[api.IPFamily]ipallocator.Interface{}