//     restrictions like, "must refer only to types A and B" or "UID not honored" or "name must be restricted".
//     Those cannot be well described when embedded.
//  3. Inconsistent validation.  Because the usages are different, the validation rules are different by usage, which makes it hard for users to predict what will happen.

container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to be redirected to the API Server through its private network.

The merged fix enforces validation against the proxying address for a Node. In some cases, the fix can break clients that depend on the `nodes/proxy` subresource, specifically if a kubelet...

//     restrictions like, "must refer only to types A and B" or "UID not honored" or "name must be restricted".
//     Those cannot be well described when embedded.
//  3. Inconsistent validation.  Because the usages are different, the validation rules are different by usage, which makes it hard for users to predict what will happen.

- EndpointSlice IP validation now matches Endpoints IP validation. ([#101084](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/101084), [@robscott](https://github.com/robscott)) [SIG Apps and Network]