//   we try to limit what confidential information could be exfiltrated (from AuthInfo). Additionally, the user cannot control
		//   the paths we send requests to, limiting potential attack scope.
		// * Cluster.CertificateAuthority. While this reads from files, the result is not attached to the request and is instead
		//   entirely local
	}
	return nil
}

	defer s.adsClientsMutex.RUnlock()
	return maps.Values(s.adsClients)
}

func (s *DiscoveryServer) WaitForRequestLimit(ctx context.Context) error {
	if s.RequestRateLimit.Limit() == 0 {
		// Allow opt out when rate limiting is set to 0qps
		return nil
	}
	// Give a bit of time for queue to clear out, but if not fail fast. Client will connect to another
	// instance in best case, or retry with backoff.

Go 1.22 adds a configurable limit to control the maximum acceptable RSA key size
that can be used in TLS handshakes, controlled by the [`tlsmaxrsasize` setting](/pkg/crypto/tls#Conn.Handshake).
The default is tlsmaxrsasize=8192, limiting RSA to 8192-bit keys. To avoid
denial of service attacks, this setting and default was backported to Go
1.19.13, Go 1.20.8, and Go 1.21.1.

Go 1.22 made it an error for a request or response read by a net/http

  for (int component_index = 0; component_index < tensors_.size();
       ++component_index) {
    // TODO(allenl): Add a C API for summarizing tensors. Currently custom
    // devices limiting themselves to a C API (for ABI compatibility) would need
    // to implement summarization for component tensors themselves.
    ImmediateExecutionTensorHandle* component =

    if (strictParsing) {
      checkState(
          this.maximumSize == UNSET_INT,
          "weigher can not be combined with maximum size (%s provided)",
          this.maximumSize);
    }

    // safely limiting the kinds of caches this can produce
    @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
    CacheBuilder<K1, V1> me = (CacheBuilder<K1, V1>) this;
    me.weigher = checkNotNull(weigher);
    return me;
  }

func (l *GCCPULimiter) Capacity() uint64 {
	return l.limiter.bucket.capacity
}

func (l *GCCPULimiter) Overflow() uint64 {
	return l.limiter.overflow
}

func (l *GCCPULimiter) Limiting() bool {
	return l.limiter.limiting()
}

func (l *GCCPULimiter) NeedUpdate(now int64) bool {
	return l.limiter.needUpdate(now)
}

func (l *GCCPULimiter) StartGCTransition(enableGC bool, now int64) {

	fs.Int32Var(&c.KubeAPIBurst, "kube-api-burst", c.KubeAPIBurst, "Burst to use while talking with kubernetes apiserver. The number must be >= 0. If 0 will use DefaultBurst: 100. Doesn't cover events and node heartbeat apis which rate limiting is controlled by a different set of flags")

	}
}

func TestServerWithSelectiveListeningAddress(t *testing.T) {
	listener := newFakeListener()
	httpFactory := newFakeHTTPServerFactory()
	proxyChecker := &fakeProxierHealthChecker{true}

	// limiting addresses to loop back. We don't want any cleverness here around getting IP for
	// machine nor testing ipv6 || ipv4. using loop back guarantees the test will work on any machine

		bufwords = min
	}

	// Buffer sizes must be power of two, so that we don't have to
	// worry about uint32 wraparound changing the effective position
	// within the buffers. We store 30 bits of count; limiting to 28
	// gives us some room for intermediate calculations.
	if bufwords >= 1<<28 || tags >= 1<<28 {
		throw("newProfBuf: buffer too large")
	}
	var i int
	for i = 1; i < bufwords; i <<= 1 {
	}

   * @since 14.0 (since 1.0 as com.google.common.io.NullOutputStream)
   */
  public static OutputStream nullOutputStream() {
    return NULL_OUTPUT_STREAM;
  }

  /**
   * Wraps a {@link InputStream}, limiting the number of bytes which can be read.
   *
   * @param in the input stream to be wrapped
   * @param limit the maximum number of bytes to be read
   * @return a length-limited {@link InputStream}