assertThat(hpackReader!!.headerCount).isEqualTo(1)
  }

  /** Header table backing array is initially 8 long, let's ensure it grows.  */
  @Test
  fun dynamicallyGrowsBeyond64Entries() {
    // Lots of headers need more room!
    hpackReader = Hpack.Reader(bytesIn, 16384, 4096)
    bytesIn.writeByte(0x3F) // Dynamic table size update (size = 16384).
    bytesIn.writeByte(0xE1)
    bytesIn.writeByte(0x7F)

    if (unknownValues) return false

    // If the server returned a value for client_max_window_bits, fail the web socket.
    if (clientMaxWindowBits != null) return false

    // If the server returned an illegal server_max_window_bits, fail the web socket.
    if (serverMaxWindowBits != null && serverMaxWindowBits !in 8..15) return false

    // Success.
    return true
  }

 *  New: Enforce label length limits in URLs. `HttpUrl` now rejects URLs whose domains aren't valid.
    This includes overly-long domain names (longer than 253 characters), overly-long labels (more
    than 63 characters between dots), and empty labels.
 *  New: Don't include the `Content-Length` header in multipart bodies. Servers must delimit
    OkHttp's request bodies using the boundary only. (This change makes OkHttp more consistent with

    health check fails.


## Version 2.7.0

_2015-12-13_

 *  **Rewritten connection management.** Previously OkHttp's connection pool
    managed both idle and active connections for HTTP/2, but only idle
    connections for HTTP/1.x. With this update the connection pool manages both
    idle and active connections for everything. OkHttp now detects and warns on
    connections that were allocated but never released, and will enforce HTTP/2

     *
     * RFC 2388 is rather vague about how one should escape special characters in form-data
     * parameters, and as it turns out Firefox and Chrome actually do rather different things, and
     * both say in their comments that they're not really sure what the right approach is. We go
     * with Chrome's behavior (which also experimentally seems to match what IE does), but if you

  //
  // Socket writes are guarded by frameWriter.
  //
  // Socket reads are unguarded but are only made by the reader thread.
  //
  // Certain operations (like SYN_STREAM) need to synchronize on both the frameWriter (to do
  // blocking I/O) and this (to create streams). Such operations must synchronize on 'this' last.
  // This ensures that we never wait for a blocking operation while holding 'this'.

 * fills, it is doubled.
 */
@Suppress("NAME_SHADOWING")
object Hpack {
  private const val PREFIX_4_BITS = 0x0f
  private const val PREFIX_5_BITS = 0x1f
  private const val PREFIX_6_BITS = 0x3f
  private const val PREFIX_7_BITS = 0x7f

  private const val SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE = 4_096

  /**

   changing `.java` files.

 * **Kotlin source compatibility** is the ability to upgrade Kotlin uses of OkHttp 3.x to 4.x
   without changing `.kt` files.

With a few small exceptions (below), OkHttp 4.x is both binary- and Java source-compatible with
OkHttp 3.x. You can use an OkHttp 4.x .jar file with applications or libraries built for OkHttp 3.x.

  }

  /**
   * This is an extraordinary test case. Here's what it's trying to simulate.
   * - 2 requests happen concurrently to a host that can be coalesced onto a single connection.
   * - Both request discover no existing connection. They both make a connection.
   * - The first request "wins the race".
   * - The second request discovers it "lost the race" and closes the connection it just opened.

        .certificatePinner(certificatePinner)
        .build()

    // Add a bad intermediate CA and have that issue a rogue certificate for localhost. Prepare
    // an SSL context for an attacking webserver. It includes both these rogue certificates plus the
    // trusted good certificate above. The attack is that by including the good certificate in the
    // chain, we may trick the certificate pinner into accepting the rouge certificate.