// Copyright Istio Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,

//go:build !agent
// +build !agent

// Copyright Istio Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,

func deriveSuiteName(caller string) string {
	d := filepath.Dir(caller)
	// We will trim out paths preceding some well known paths. This should handle anything in istio or docs repo,
	// as well as special case tests/integration. The end result is a test under ./tests/integration/pilot/ingress
	// will become pilot_ingress
	// Note: if this fails to trim, we end up with "ugly" suite names but otherwise no real impact.

spec:
  ingressClassName: %s
  tls:
  - hosts: ["foo.example.com"]
    secretName: k8s-ingress-secret-foo
  - hosts: ["bar.example.com"]
    secretName: k8s-ingress-secret-bar
  rules:
  - http:
      paths:
      - backend:
          service:
            name: b
            port:
              name: http
        path: %s/namedport
        pathType: ImplementationSpecific
      - backend:
          service:

		// * Cluster.Server (and ProxyURL). This allows the user to send requests to arbitrary URLs, enabling potential SSRF attacks.
		//   However, we don't actually know what valid URLs are, so we cannot reasonably constrain this. Instead,
		//   we try to limit what confidential information could be exfiltrated (from AuthInfo). Additionally, the user cannot control
		//   the paths we send requests to, limiting potential attack scope.

		expected:   []message{
			// no messages, this test case verifies no false positives
		},
	},
	{
		name:       "externalControlPlaneValidWebhooks",
		inputFiles: []string{"testdata/externalcontrolplane-valid-urls-custom-ns.yaml"},
		analyzer:   &externalcontrolplane.ExternalControlPlaneAnalyzer{},
		expected:   []message{
			// no messages, this test case verifies no false positives
		},
	},
	{