}
		if errors.Is(err, kes.ErrNotAllowed) {
			return DEK{}, ErrPermission
		}
		return DEK{}, errKeyGenerationFailed(err)
	}
	return DEK{
		KeyID:      name,
		Plaintext:  dek.Plaintext,
		Ciphertext: dek.Ciphertext,
	}, nil
}

// ImportKey imports a cryptographic key into the KMS.
func (c *kesConn) ImportKey(ctx context.Context, keyID string, bytes []byte) error {

		return
	}

	// For each block, we need to xor the decrypted data with the previous block's ciphertext (the iv).
	// To avoid making a copy each time, we loop over the blocks BACKWARDS.
	end := len(src)
	start := end - x.blockSize
	prev := start - x.blockSize

	// Copy the last block of ciphertext in preparation as the new iv.
	copy(x.tmp, src[start:end])

	// Loop over all but the first block.

// IsEncryptedPEMBlock returns whether the PEM block is password encrypted
// according to RFC 1423.
//
// Deprecated: Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by
// design. Since it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to
// padding oracle attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext.
func IsEncryptedPEMBlock(b *pem.Block) bool {
	_, ok := b.Headers["DEK-Info"]
	return ok
}

				}
				original := append([]byte{}, data...)

				ciphertext, err := tt.t.TransformToStorage(ctx, data, dataCtx)
				if err != nil {
					t.Errorf("TransformToStorage error = %v", err)
					continue
				}

				result, stale, err := tt.t.TransformFromStorage(ctx, ciphertext, dataCtx)
				if err != nil {
					t.Errorf("TransformFromStorage error = %v", err)
					continue

		panic("message limit reached")
	}
	s.seqNum = s.seqNum.addOne()
	return nonce
}

func (s *Sender) Seal(aad, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {

	ciphertext := s.aead.Seal(nil, s.nextNonce(), plaintext, aad)
	return ciphertext, nil
}

func SuiteID(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16) []byte {
	suiteID := make([]byte, 0, 4+2+2+2)
	suiteID = append(suiteID, []byte("HPKE")...)

		return
	}

	// 2. Verify that we can indeed decrypt the (encrypted) key
	decryptedKey, err := GlobalKMS.Decrypt(ctx, &kms.DecryptRequest{
		Name:           key.KeyID,
		Ciphertext:     key.Ciphertext,
		AssociatedData: kmsContext,
	})
	if err != nil {
		response.DecryptionErr = err.Error()
		resp, err := json.Marshal(response)
		if err != nil {

  // keyID must satisfy the following constraints:
  // 1. The keyID is not empty.
  // 2. The size of keyID is less than 1 kB.
  string keyID = 2;

  // EncryptedDEKSource is the ciphertext of the source of the DEK used to encrypt the data stored in encryptedData.
  // encryptedDEKSourceType defines the process of using the plaintext of this field to determine the aforementioned DEK.

	if err := t.nonceFunc(result[:nonceSize]); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write nonce for AES-GCM: %w", err)
	}

	cipherText := t.aead.Seal(result[nonceSize:nonceSize], result[:nonceSize], data, dataCtx.AuthenticatedData())
	return result[:nonceSize+len(cipherText)], nil
}

// cbc implements encryption at rest of the provided values given a cipher.Block algorithm.
type cbc struct {
	block cipher.Block
}

	response, err := g.kmsClient.Decrypt(ctx, request)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return response.Plain, nil
}

// Encrypt bytes to a string ciphertext.
func (g *gRPCService) Encrypt(plain []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), g.callTimeout)
	defer cancel()

type Service interface {
	// Decrypt a given bytearray to obtain the original data as bytes.
	Decrypt(data []byte) ([]byte, error)
	// Encrypt bytes to a ciphertext.
	Encrypt(data []byte) ([]byte, error)
}

type envelopeTransformer struct {
	envelopeService Service

	// transformers is a thread-safe LRU cache which caches decrypted DEKs indexed by their encrypted form.