$old_path = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable(\"PATH\", \"Machine\"); \
    [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(\"PATH\", $old_path + \";C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\", \"Machine\");


# Restore default shell for Windows containers.
SHELL ["cmd.exe", "/s", "/c"]

# Default to PowerShell if no other command specified.

    *   Provided a new `experimental_skip_saver` argument which, if specified, will suppress the addition of `SavedModel`-native save and restore ops to the `SavedModel`, for cases where users already build custom save/restore ops and checkpoint formats for the model being saved, and the creation of the SavedModel-native save/restore ops simply cause longer model serialization times.

* Add ops to `tensorflow.raw_ops` that were missing.

* `tf.CheckpointOptions`

# pretend the path is a directory.
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_ENABLE=1
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_SA_PATH="${KOKORO_KEYSTORE_DIR}/73361_tensorflow_release_binary_uploader_service_account"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_URI="gs://tensorflow/versions/"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_PYPI_ARGS="--config-file=$KOKORO_KEYSTORE_DIR/73361_tensorflow_pypirc_using_global_api_token --repository pypi-warehouse"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_PYPI_ENABLE=1

we don't consider this as a vulnerability, given that models can exhaust
resources in many different ways and solutions exist to prevent this from
happening (e.g., rate limits, ACLs, monitors to restart broken servers).

### Model sharing

If the multitenant design allows sharing models, make sure that tenants and
users are aware of the security risks detailed here and that they are going to

# pretend the path is a directory.
# 1. Upload nightlies
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_ENABLE=1
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_SA_PATH="${KOKORO_KEYSTORE_DIR}/73361_tensorflow_release_binary_uploader_service_account"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_GCS_URI="gs://tensorflow/nightly/"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_PYPI_ARGS="--config-file=$KOKORO_KEYSTORE_DIR/73361_tensorflow_pypirc_using_global_api_token --repository pypi-warehouse"
TFCI_ARTIFACT_FINAL_PYPI_ENABLE=1