rbac.SchemeGroupVersion.WithResource("roles").GroupResource():        true,
}

// RoleEscalationAuthorized checks if the user associated with the context is explicitly authorized to escalate the role resource associated with the context
func RoleEscalationAuthorized(ctx context.Context, a authorizer.Authorizer) bool {
	if a == nil {
		return false
	}

	user, ok := genericapirequest.UserFrom(ctx)

    @Override
    public <T> T withFileLock(Supplier<T> factory) {
        throw failure();
    }

    protected UnsupportedOperationException failure() {
        return new UnsupportedOperationException("Cannot escalate a shared lock to an exclusive lock. This is not yet supported.");
    }

	}
	_, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
	return err
}

const highPrivUser = "root"

func setSetuid(t *testing.T, user, bin string) {
	t.Helper()
	// We escalate privileges here even if we are root, because for some reason on some builders
	// (at least freebsd-amd64-13_0) the default PATH doesn't include /usr/sbin, which is where

However, for the vast majority of issues, we aim to empower individuals to first resolve conflicts themselves, asking for help when needed, and only after that fails to escalate further. This approach gives people more control over the outcome of their dispute. 

If you are experiencing or witnessing conflict, we ask you to use the following escalation strategy to address the conflict:

		// the context expires, then wait one grace period for the process to
		// produce whatever useful output it can (such as a stack trace). After the
		// first grace period expires, we'll escalate to os.Kill, leaving the second
		// grace period for the test function to record its output before the test
		// process itself terminates.
		timeout -= 2 * gracePeriod

		var cancel context.CancelFunc

    name: system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller
  rules:
  - apiGroups:
    - rbac.authorization.k8s.io
    resources:
    - clusterroles
    verbs:
    - escalate
    - get
    - list
    - patch
    - update
    - watch
- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
  kind: ClusterRole
  metadata:
    annotations:

		Rules: []rbacv1.PolicyRule{
			// this controller must have full permissions on clusterroles to allow it to mutate them in any way
			rbacv1helpers.NewRule("escalate", "get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch").Groups(rbacGroup).Resources("clusterroles").RuleOrDie(),
		},
	})
	addControllerRole(&controllerRoles, &controllerRoleBindings, rbacv1.ClusterRole{

	}

	// 3.2 check that user cannot delete the bucket
	err = uClient.RemoveBucket(ctx, bucket)
	if err == nil || err.Error() != "Access Denied." {
		c.Fatalf("User was able to escalate privileges (Err=%v)!", err)
	}
}

func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestAddServiceAccountPerms(c *check) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
	defer cancel()

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet >= v1.8.0

**Fixed Versions**:

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet >= v1.8.0

**Fixed Versions**: