// because there will be a policy mapping stored on drives whose
	// filename is this parentUser: therefore, it needs to have only valid
	// filename characters and needs to have bounded length.
	{
		h := sha256.New()
		h.Write([]byte("openid:" + subFromToken + ":" + issFromToken))
		bs := h.Sum(nil)
		cred.ParentUser = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(bs)
	}

	// Add future tracking capabilities
	// Be sure that they are included in toHealingDisk
}

// loadHealingTracker will load the healing tracker from the supplied disk.
// The disk ID will be validated against the loaded one.
func loadHealingTracker(ctx context.Context, disk StorageAPI) (*healingTracker, error) {
	if disk == nil {
		return nil, errors.New("loadHealingTracker: nil drive given")
	}
	diskID, err := disk.GetDiskID()

	if bucket != path.Clean(resource[1:]) {
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMethodNotAllowed), r.URL)
		return
	}

	// Here the parameter is the size of the form data that should
	// be loaded in memory, the remaining being put in temporary files.
	mp, err := r.MultipartReader()
	if err != nil {
		apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)

	healDeleteDangling   = true
	healObjectSelectProb = 1024 // Overall probability of a file being scanned; one in n.
)

var (
	globalHealConfig heal.Config

	// Sleeper values are updated when config is loaded.
	scannerSleeper                       = newDynamicSleeper(2, time.Second, true) // Keep defaults same as config defaults
	scannerCycle                         = uatomic.NewDuration(dataScannerStartDelay)

package bpool

import "github.com/klauspost/reedsolomon"

// BytePoolCap implements a leaky pool of []byte in the form of a bounded channel.
type BytePoolCap struct {
	c    chan []byte
	w    int
	wcap int
}

// NewBytePoolCap creates a new BytePool bounded to the given maxSize, with new
// byte arrays sized based on width.
func NewBytePoolCap(maxSize uint64, width int, capwidth int) (bp *BytePoolCap) {

				if err != nil {
					// ignore history file if not readable.
					continue
				}

				data, err = decryptData(data, obj.Name)
				if err != nil {
					// ignore history file that cannot be loaded.
					continue
				}

				cfgEntry.Data = string(data)
			}
			configHistory = append(configHistory, cfgEntry)
			count--
			if count == 0 {
				break
			}
		}
		if !res.IsTruncated {

		}
	}
	for {
		// Handle the extremely unlikely scenario that we wrapped.
		if _, loaded := c.outgoing.LoadOrStore(client.MuxID, client); client.MuxID != 0 && !loaded {
			if debugReqs {
				_, found := c.outgoing.Load(client.MuxID)
				fmt.Println(client.MuxID, c.String(), "Connection.newMuxClient: RELOADED MUX. loaded:", loaded, "found:", found)
			}
			return client, nil
		}
		client.MuxID = atomic.AddUint64(&c.NextID, 1)

To summarize for any encrypted object there exists (at least) three different keys:

- [OEK](#oek): A secret and unique key used to encrypted the object, stored in an encrypted form as part of the object metadata and only loaded to RAM in plaintext during en/decrypting the object.

}

// reset the value of the Global server config.
// set it to `nil`.
func resetGlobalConfig() {
	// hold the mutex lock before a new config is assigned.
	globalServerConfigMu.Lock()
	// Save the loaded config globally.
	globalServerConfig = nil
	globalServerConfigMu.Unlock()
}

func resetGlobalEndpoints() {
	globalEndpoints = EndpointServerPools{}
}

func resetGlobalIsErasure() {

		}
		uploadedParts = append(uploadedParts, minio.CompletePart{
			PartNumber: pInfo.PartNumber,
			ETag:       pInfo.ETag,
		})
	}

	// really big value but its okay on heavily loaded systems. This is just tail end timeout.
	cctx, ccancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Minute)
	defer ccancel()
	_, err = c.CompleteMultipartUpload(cctx, bucket, object, uploadID, uploadedParts, minio.PutObjectOptions{