Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:

*   The use of sexualized language or imagery and unwelcome sexual attention or
    advances.
*   Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks.
*   Public or private harassment.
*   Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic
    address, without explicit permission.

    # Return some error
    ...
```

But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks".

### Timing Attacks

But what's a "timing attack"?

Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password.

And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.

### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published
research](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=gpu+side+channel) shows that it
might be possible to use side channel attacks on the GPU to leak data from other
running models or processes in the same system. GPUs can also have
implementation bugs that might allow attackers to leave malicious code running

By default, OkHttp trusts the certificate authorities of the host platform. This strategy maximizes connectivity, but it is subject to certificate authority attacks such as the [2011 DigiNotar attack](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2510951/cybercrime-hacking/hackers-spied-on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:

* The use of sexualized language or imagery and unwelcome sexual attention or
  advances
* Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
* Public or private harassment
* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic
  address, without explicit permission
* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a

```Python hl_lines="2  6"
{!../../../docs_src/advanced_middleware/tutorial001.py!}
```

## `TrustedHostMiddleware`

Enforces that all incoming requests have a correctly set `Host` header, in order to guard against HTTP Host Header attacks.

```Python hl_lines="2  6-8"
{!../../../docs_src/advanced_middleware/tutorial002.py!}
```

The following arguments are supported:

The *Secure Channel* splits the object content into chunks of a fixed size of `65536` bytes. The last chunk may be smaller to avoid adding additional overhead and is treated specially to prevent truncation attacks. The nonce value is 96 bits long and generated randomly per object / multi-part part. The *Secure Channel* supports plaintexts up to `65536 * 2^32 = 256 TiB`.

#### Randomness

   documentation may negatively impact others.

 * **Be respectful**: We expect people to work together to resolve conflict, assume good intentions,
   and act with empathy. Do not turn disagreements into personal attacks.

 * **Be collaborative**: Collaboration reduces redundancy and improves the quality of our work. We
   strive for transparency within our open source community, and we work closely with upstream

that can be used in TLS handshakes, controlled by the [`tlsmaxrsasize` setting](/pkg/crypto/tls#Conn.Handshake).
The default is tlsmaxrsasize=8192, limiting RSA to 8192-bit keys. To avoid
denial of service attacks, this setting and default was backported to Go
1.19.13, Go 1.20.8, and Go 1.21.1.

Go 1.22 made it an error for a request or response read by a net/http
client or server to have an empty Content-Length header.

      }

    /**
     * Configures this to not authenticate the HTTPS server on to [hostname]. This makes the user
     * vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and should only be used only in private development
     * environments and only to carry test data.
     *
     * The server’s TLS certificate **does not need to be signed** by a trusted certificate