* called certificate authorities (CAs).
 *
 * Browsers and other HTTP clients need a set of trusted root certificates to authenticate their
 * peers. Sets of root certificates are managed by either the HTTP client (like Firefox), or the
 * host platform (like Android). In July 2018 Android had 134 trusted root certificates for its HTTP
 * clients to trust.
 *

import okhttp3.internal.toCanonicalHost
import okio.ByteString
import okio.ByteString.Companion.decodeBase64
import okio.ByteString.Companion.toByteString

/**
 * Constrains which certificates are trusted. Pinning certificates defends against attacks on
 * certificate authorities. It also prevents connections through man-in-the-middle certificate
 * authorities either known or unknown to the application's user.

 *  Fix: Handshake now returns peer certificates in canonical order: each certificate is signed by
    the certificate that follows and the last certificate is signed by a trusted root.

 *  Fix: Don't lose HTTP/2 flow control bytes when incoming data races with a stream close. If this
    happened enough then eventually the connection would stall.

          listOf(
            "Inaccessible trust store",
            "trustStore is",
            "Reload the trust store",
            "Reload trust certs",
            "Reloaded",
            "adding as trusted certificates",
            "Ignore disabled cipher suite",
            "Ignore unsupported cipher suite",
          ).joinToString(separator = "|"),
        )
        append(").*")
      },
    )

          // Consuming ServerHello handshake message
          // Consuming server Certificate handshake message
          // Consuming server CertificateStatus handshake message
          // Found trusted certificate
          // Consuming ECDH ServerKeyExchange handshake message
          // Consuming ServerHelloDone handshake message
          // Produced ECDHE ClientKeyExchange handshake message

   */
  fun noClientAuth() {
    this.clientAuth = CLIENT_AUTH_NONE
  }

  /**
   * Configure the server to [want client auth][SSLSocket.setWantClientAuth]. If the
   * client presents a certificate that is [trusted][TrustManager] the handshake will
   * proceed normally. The connection will also proceed normally if the client presents no
   * certificate at all! But if the client presents an untrusted certificate the handshake

   *
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *
   * ```
   *   pinnedRoot (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *     -> pinnedIntermediate (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *       -> realVictim
   * ```
   *
   * The attacker compromises a CA. They take the public key from an intermediate certificate

    `EventSourceListener.onOpen()`.
 *  Fix: Enforce the max intermediates constraint when using pinned certificates with Conscrypt.
    This impacts Conscrypt when the server's presented certificates form both a trusted-but-unpinned
    chain and an untrusted-but-pinned chain.
 *  Upgrade: [Kotlin 1.6.10][kotlin_1_6_10].


## Version 5.0.0-alpha.3

_2021-11-22_

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