Optional:    true,
			Type:        "on|off",
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         ClaimPrefix,
			Description: `[DEPRECATED use 'claim_name'] JWT claim namespace prefix e.g. "customer1/"` + defaultHelpPostfix(ClaimPrefix),
			Optional:    true,
			Type:        "string",
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         RedirectURI,

import (
	"fmt"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
)

var (
	defaultKeyFunc = func(claim *MapClaims) ([]byte, error) { return []byte("HelloSecret"), nil }
	emptyKeyFunc   = func(claim *MapClaims) ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
	errorKeyFunc   = func(claim *MapClaims) ([]byte, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error loading key") }
)

var jwtTestData = []struct {
	name        string

		time.Sleep(time.Duration(d))
	}

	l.mutex.Lock()
	defer l.mutex.Unlock()
	if _, reply = l.lockMap[args.Resources[0]]; !reply {
		l.lockMap[args.Resources[0]] = WriteLock // No locks held on the given name, so claim write lock
	}
	reply = !reply // Negate *reply to return true when lock is granted or false otherwise
	return reply, nil
}

func (l *lockServer) Unlock(args *LockArgs) (reply bool, err error) {

	// the user and the application that acquired the WebIdentityToken (pairwise identifier).
	// For OpenID Connect ID tokens, this field contains the value returned by the identity
	// provider as the token's sub (Subject) claim.
	SubjectFromWebIdentityToken string `xml:",omitempty"`
}

// AssumeRoleWithClientGrantsResponse contains the result of successful AssumeRoleWithClientGrants request.
type AssumeRoleWithClientGrantsResponse struct {

// or service credentials, mapped to all distinct roleARNs associated with the
// parent user. The dummy role ARN is associated with parent users from
// policy-claim based OpenID providers.
func (store *IAMStoreSys) GetAllParentUsers() map[string]ParentUserInfo {
	cache := store.rlock()
	defer store.runlock()

	res := map[string]ParentUserInfo{}

	"github.com/minio/pkg/v2/policy"
)

// OpenID keys and envs.
const (
	ClientID      = "client_id"
	ClientSecret  = "client_secret"
	ConfigURL     = "config_url"
	ClaimName     = "claim_name"
	ClaimUserinfo = "claim_userinfo"
	RolePolicy    = "role_policy"
	DisplayName   = "display_name"

	Scopes             = "scopes"
	RedirectURI        = "redirect_uri"
	RedirectURIDynamic = "redirect_uri_dynamic"

	if !ok {
		return errors.New("STS JWT Token has `aud` claim invalid, `aud` must match configured OpenID Client ID")
	}
	if !audValues.Contains(pCfg.ClientID) {
		// if audience claims is missing, look for "azp" claims.
		// OPTIONAL. Authorized party - the party to which the ID
		// Token was issued. If present, it MUST contain the OAuth
		// 2.0 Client ID of this party. This Claim is only needed

		}

		// Finally, if there is no parent policy, check if a policy claim is
		// present in the session token.
		if len(policies) == 0 {
			// If there is no parent policy mapping, we fall back to
			// using policy claim from JWT.
			policySet, ok := args.GetPolicies(iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
			if !ok {
				// When claims are set, it should have a policy claim field.
				return false
			}

// the i-th server in this will be applied the i-th policy in `rolePolicies`. If
// a rolePolicies entry is an empty string, that server will be configured as
// policy-claim based openid server. NOTE that a valid configuration can have a
// policy claim based provider only if it is the only OpenID provider.
func (s *TestSuiteIAM) SetUpOpenIDs(c *check, testApps []OpenIDClientAppParams, rolePolicies []string) error {

	// secret key, temporary credentials become invalid if
	// server admin credentials change. This is done to ensure
	// that clients cannot decode the token using the temp
	// secret keys and generate an entirely new claim by essentially
	// hijacking the policies. We need to make sure that this is
	// based on admin credential such that token cannot be decoded
	// on the client side and is treated like an opaque value.