outer.encryptedClientHello, err = generateOuterECHExt(ech.config.ConfigID, ech.kdfID, ech.aeadID, encapKey, make([]byte, encryptedLen))
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	serializedOuter, err := outer.marshal()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	serializedOuter = serializedOuter[4:] // strip the four byte prefix
	encryptedInner, err := ech.hpkeContext.Seal(serializedOuter, encodedInner)
	if err != nil {

	_      = flag.Bool("ipv6", false, "")

	echConfigListB64           = flag.String("ech-config-list", "", "")
	expectECHAccepted          = flag.Bool("expect-ech-accept", false, "")
	expectHRR                  = flag.Bool("expect-hrr", false, "")
	expectedECHRetryConfigs    = flag.String("expect-ech-retry-configs", "", "")
	expectNoECHRetryConfigs    = flag.Bool("expect-no-ech-retry-configs", false, "")

        "TLS-ECH-Client-Reject-TLS12-NoFalseStart": "We won't attempt to negotiate 1.2 if ECH is enabled",
        "TLS-ECH-Client-TLS12SessionTicket": "We won't attempt to negotiate 1.2 if ECH is enabled",
        "TLS-ECH-Client-TLS12SessionID": "We won't attempt to negotiate 1.2 if ECH is enabled",

		echPK, err := hpke.ParseHPKEPublicKey(ech.config.KemID, ech.config.PublicKey)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, nil, nil, err
		}
		suite, err := pickECHCipherSuite(ech.config.SymmetricCipherSuite)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, nil, nil, err
		}
		ech.kdfID, ech.aeadID = suite.KDFID, suite.AEADID
		info := append([]byte("tls ech\x00"), ech.config.raw...)

			return err
		}
	} else if hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello != nil {
		// Unsolicited ECH extension should be rejected
		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
		return errors.New("tls: unexpected ECH extension in serverHello")
	}

	// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and

	// roots in RootCAs will be used to verify the ECH providers public
	// certificate. VerifyPeerCertificate and VerifyConnection are not called
	// when ECH is rejected, even if set, and InsecureSkipVerify is ignored.
	EncryptedClientHelloRejectionVerify func(ConnectionState) error

	// mutex protects sessionTicketKeys and autoSessionTicketKeys.
	mutex sync.RWMutex

	}{
		{
			name:        "no callbacks",
			expectedErr: "tls: server rejected ECH",
		},
		{
			name: "EncryptedClientHelloRejectionVerify, no err",
			encryptedClientHelloRejectionVerify: func(ConnectionState) error {
				return nil
			},
			expectedErr: "tls: server rejected ECH",
		},
		{
			name: "EncryptedClientHelloRejectionVerify, err",

		exts.AddUint16(extensionEncryptedClientHello)
		exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) {
			exts.AddBytes(m.encryptedClientHello)
		})
	}
	// Note that any extension that can be compressed during ECH must be
	// contiguous. If any additional extensions are to be compressed they must
	// be added to the following block, so that they can be properly
	// decompressed on the other side.
	var echOuterExts []uint16

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