// We need a pod IP - if the pod was added via the CNI plugin, that plugin told us the IPs
			// for the pod. If this is a pod added via informer, the pod should have already gone thru
			// the CNI plugin chain, and have a PodIP.
			//
			// If PodIPs exists, it is preferred, otherwise fallback to PodIP.
			//
			// If we get to this point and have a pod that really and truly has no IP in either of those,

	// the policy lookup would ambiguous.
	if r.TLS == nil {
		writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInsecureConnection, errors.New("No TLS connection attempt"))
		return
	}

	// A client may send a certificate chain such that we end up
	// with multiple peer certificates. However, we can only accept
	// a single client certificate. Otherwise, the certificate to
	// policy mapping would be ambiguous.

	DB.Create(&address)

	var result AddressByZipCode
	DB.First(&result, "00501")

	AssertEqual(t, result, address)
}

func TestSearchWithEmptyChain(t *testing.T) {
	user := User{Name: "search_with_empty_chain", Age: 1}
	DB.Create(&user)

	var result User
	if DB.Where("").Where("").First(&result).Error != nil {
		t.Errorf("Should not raise any error if searching with empty strings")
	}

	result = User{}

		// Only grab the first (client) address. Note that '192.168.0.1,
		// 10.1.1.1' is a valid key for X-Forwarded-For where addresses after
		// the first may represent forwarding proxies earlier in the chain.
		s := strings.Index(fwd, ", ")
		if s == -1 {
			s = len(fwd)
		}
		addr = fwd[:s]
	} else if fwd := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); fwd != "" {
		// X-Real-IP should only contain one IP address (the client making the

	}

	DB.Model(&User{}).Where("name = ?", user1.Name).Count(&count1).Or("name in ?", []string{user2.Name, user3.Name}).Count(&count2)
	if count1 != 1 || count2 != 3 {
		t.Errorf("multiple count in chain should works")
	}

	tx := DB.Model(&User{}).Where("name = ?", user1.Name).Session(&gorm.Session{})
	tx.Count(&count1)
	tx.Or("name in ?", []string{user2.Name, user3.Name}).Count(&count2)
	if count1 != 1 || count2 != 3 {

	log.Info("configuring host-level iptables rules (healthchecks, etc)")

	iptablesBuilder := builder.NewIptablesRuleBuilder(ipbuildConfig(cfg.cfg))

	// For easier cleanup, insert a jump into an owned chain
	// -A POSTROUTING -p tcp -j ISTIO_POSTRT
	iptablesBuilder.AppendRule(
		iptableslog.UndefinedCommand, iptablesconstants.POSTROUTING, iptablesconstants.NAT,
		"-j", ChainHostPostrouting,
	)

		GetValidationContext().
		GetTrustedCa().
		GetInlineBytes()

	// seems as though the most straightforward way to tell whether this is a root ca or not
	// is to check whether the inline bytes of the cert chain or the trusted ca field is zero length
	if len(certChainSecret) > 0 {
		builder.Data(string(certChainSecret))
	} else if len(caDataSecret) > 0 {
		builder.Data(string(caDataSecret))
	}

	Certificates []*CertsDump                `json:"certificates"`
}

type CertsDump struct {
	Identity  string  `json:"identity"`
	State     string  `json:"state"`
	CertChain []*Cert `json:"cert_chain"`
}

type Cert struct {
	Pem            string `json:"pem"`
	SerialNumber   string `json:"serial_number"`
	ValidFrom      string `json:"valid_from"`
	ExpirationTime string `json:"expiration_time"`

		return false
	}
	if f := dt.Field[0]; f.Name != "unused" || f.Type.Common().Name != "int" {
		return false
	}
	return true
}

// baseBadPointerTypedef reports whether the base of a chain of typedefs is a bad typedef
// as badPointerTypedef reports.
func (c *typeConv) baseBadPointerTypedef(dt *dwarf.TypedefType) bool {
	for {
		if t, ok := dt.Type.(*dwarf.TypedefType); ok {
			dt = t
			continue

			Optional:    true,
			Type:        "duration",
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         target.NATSCertAuthority,
			Description: "path to certificate chain of the target NATS server",
			Optional:    true,
			Type:        "string",
			Sensitive:   true,
		},
		config.HelpKV{
			Key:         target.NATSClientCert,
			Description: "client cert for NATS mTLS auth",