*
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *
   * ```
   *   pinnedRoot (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *     -> pinnedIntermediate (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *       -> realVictim
   * ```
   *
   * The attacker compromises a CA. They take the public key from an intermediate certificate

    /**
     * Configure the certificate chain to use when being authenticated. The first certificate is
     * the held certificate, further certificates are included in the handshake so the peer can
     * build a trusted path to a trusted root certificate.
     *
     * The chain should include all intermediate certificates but does not need the root certificate
     * that we expect to be known by the remote peer. The peer already has that certificate so

 *
 * <p>This interface is intended for internal use.</p>
 */
public interface DfsResolver {

    /**
     * Checks if a domain is trusted for DFS operations
     * @param tf the CIFS context
     * @param domain the domain name to check
     * @return whether the given domain is trusted
     * @throws CIFSException if the operation fails
     */
    boolean isTrustedDomain(CIFSContext tf, String domain) throws CIFSException;

-----------------------

The above example uses a self-signed certificate. This is convenient for testing but not
representative of real-world HTTPS deployment. To get closer to that we can use `HeldCertificate`
to generate a trusted root certificate, an intermediate certificate, and a server certificate.
We use `certificateAuthority(int)` to create certificates that can sign other certificates. The

    /**
     * Cache of trusted domains for DFS resolution
     */
    protected CacheEntry _domains = null; /* aka trusted domains cache */
    /**
     * Cache of DFS referrals
     */
    protected CacheEntry referrals = null;

    /**
     * Gets the map of trusted domains for DFS resolution
     * @param auth the authentication credentials
     * @return a map of trusted domain names to domain controllers

		if err != nil {
			logger.Fatal(fmt.Errorf("invalid arguments passed, trusted user certificate authority public key file is not accessible: %v", err), "unable to start SFTP server")
		}

		globalSFTPTrustedCAPubkey, _, _, _, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(keyBytes)
		if err != nil {

* Caddy (that can also handle certificate renewals)
* Nginx
* HAProxy

## Let's Encrypt { #lets-encrypt }

Before Let's Encrypt, these **HTTPS certificates** were sold by trusted third parties.

The process to acquire one of these certificates used to be cumbersome, require quite some paperwork and the certificates were quite expensive.

    /** The SAM database does not have a computer account for this workstation trust relationship */
    int NT_STATUS_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT = 0xC000018b;
    /** The trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed */
    int NT_STATUS_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FAILURE = 0xC000018c;
    /** The trust relationship between this workstation and the primary domain failed */
    int NT_STATUS_TRUSTED_RELATIONSHIP_FAILURE = 0xC000018d;

    /** The SAM database does not have a computer account for this workstation trust relationship */
    int NT_STATUS_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT = 0xC000018b;
    /** The trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed */
    int NT_STATUS_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FAILURE = 0xC000018c;
    /** The account used is a computer account */
    int NT_STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT = 0xC0000199;

You can start FastAPI CLI with the *CLI Option* `--forwarded-allow-ips` and pass the IP addresses that should be trusted to read those forwarded headers.

If you set it to `--forwarded-allow-ips="*"` it would trust all the incoming IPs.

If your **server** is behind a trusted **proxy** and only the proxy talks to it, this would make it accept whatever is the IP of that **proxy**.

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```console