* Only trusts X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers when the request comes from a trusted proxy.
     * @param request the HTTP request
     * @return the client IP address
     */
    public String getClientIp(final HttpServletRequest request) {
        final String remoteAddr = request.getRemoteAddr();

        // Only trust proxy headers if the request comes from a trusted proxy

        assertEquals("192.168.1.100", rateLimitHelper.getClientIp(request));
    }

    @Test
    public void test_getClientIp_xForwardedFor_trustedProxy() {
        // 127.0.0.1 is configured as a trusted proxy by default
        final MockletHttpServletRequest request = getMockRequest();
        request.setRemoteAddr("127.0.0.1");
        request.addHeader("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.50, 70.41.3.18, 150.172.238.178");

   *
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *
   * ```
   *   pinnedRoot (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *     -> pinnedIntermediate (trusted by CertificatePinner)
   *       -> realVictim
   * ```
   *
   * The attacker compromises a CA. They take the public key from an intermediate certificate

```

This handshake is successful because each party has prearranged to trust the root certificate that
signs the other party's chain.

Well-Known Certificate Authorities
----------------------------------

In these examples we've prearranged which root certificates to trust. But for regular HTTPS on the
Internet this set of trusted root certificates is usually provided by default by the host platform.

              //    chain
              // We can only do this for Trusted, because Trusted implementations of cancel do
              // nothing but delegate to this method and do not permit user overrides.
              AbstractFuture<?> trusted = (AbstractFuture<?>) futureToPropagateTo;
              localValue = trusted.value();
              if (localValue == null | localValue instanceof DelegatingToFuture) {

 * called certificate authorities (CAs).
 *
 * Browsers and other HTTP clients need a set of trusted root certificates to authenticate their
 * peers. Sets of root certificates are managed by either the HTTP client (like Firefox), or the
 * host platform (like Android). In July 2018 Android had 134 trusted root certificates for its HTTP
 * clients to trust.
 *
 * For example, in order to establish a secure connection to `https://www.squareup.com/`,

///

Nevertheless, as the **application server** doesn't know it is behind a trusted **proxy**, by default, it wouldn't trust those headers.

But you can configure the **application server** to trust the *forwarded* headers sent by the **proxy**. If you are using FastAPI CLI, you can use the *CLI Option* `--forwarded-allow-ips` to tell it from which IPs it should trust those *forwarded* headers.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/5.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but limits your server team’s abilities to update their TLS certificates. **Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of your server’s TLS administrator!**

```bash
gpg --verify plugin-publish-plugin-2.0.0.jar.asc plugin-publish-plugin-2.0.0.jar
```

If you see a warning message like `gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!`, you can locally sign the Gradle key after importing it.
This tells your GPG installation that you trust this key and will prevent the warning from appearing again.

To do this, run the following command:

```bash
gpg --sign-key 1BD97A6A154E7810EE0BC832E2F38302C8075E3D

* the application is running locally (e.g. on `localhost`) or in an internal network
* and the application doesn't have any authentication, it expects that any request from the same network can be trusted.

## Example Attack { #example-attack }

Imagine you build a way to run a local AI agent.

It provides an API at

```
http://localhost:8000/v1/agents/multivac
```

There's also a frontend at