*/
  public static <N> Traverser<N> forGraph(SuccessorsFunction<N> graph) {
    return new Traverser<N>(graph) {
      @Override
      Traversal<N> newTraversal() {
        return Traversal.inGraph(graph);
      }
    };
  }

  /**
   * Creates a new traverser for a directed acyclic graph that has at most one path from the start

        // Test simple path traversal attack
        File baseDir = new File(tempDir.toFile(), "images");
        baseDir.mkdirs();
        File maliciousFile = new File(baseDir, "../../../etc/passwd");

        Boolean result = invokeIsValidUploadPath(maliciousFile, baseDir);
        assertFalse("Path traversal with ../ should be blocked", result);
    }

    @Test

            }
            expectedBaseDir = null; // Skip path traversal check for resource files
        } else {
            throwValidationError(messages -> messages.addErrorsDesignFileIsUnsupportedType("designFileName"), this::asListHtml);
            return null;
        }

        // Validate path to prevent path traversal attacks

   */
  private static <N> Iterable<N> getReachableNodes(
      Graph<N> graph, N node, TransitiveClosureSelfLoopStrategy strategy) {
    Traverser<N> traverser = Traverser.forGraph(graph);
    switch (strategy) {
      case ADD_SELF_LOOPS_ALWAYS: // always include 'node'
        return traverser.breadthFirst(node);
      case ADD_SELF_LOOPS_FOR_CYCLES: // include 'node' iff there's an incident cycle

    /**
     * Validates that a given path is safe and does not attempt path traversal attacks.
     * <p>
     * This method checks if the resolved absolute path starts with the allowed base directory,
     * preventing access to files outside the intended directory through path traversal
     * techniques like "../../../etc/passwd".
     * </p>
     * <p>
     * Example usage:
     * </p>

            Files.createDirectories(filePath.getParent());
            final Path realParent = filePath.getParent().toRealPath();
            if (!realParent.startsWith(realBase)) {
                logger.warn("Symlink traversal detected: url={}, realParent={}, realBase={}", url, realParent, realBase);
                return;
            }
            final byte[] bytes = content.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);

        return redirect(getClass()); // no-op
    }

    /**
     * Sanitizes a filename by removing path traversal sequences and whitespace.
     *
     * @param filename the filename to sanitize
     * @return the sanitized filename
     */
    public static String sanitizeFilename(final String filename) {

    }

    /**
     * Test isPathSafe with path traversal attempt
     *
     * @throws Exception
     */
    @Test
    public void testIsPathSafe_PathTraversalAttempt() throws Exception {
        final Path baseDir = tempFolder.getRoot().toPath();
        final Path traversalPath = baseDir.resolve("../../../etc/passwd");

        assertFalse("Path traversal should be blocked", FileUtil.isPathSafe(traversalPath, baseDir));

 * href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graph_(discrete_mathematics)">graph</a>-structured data.
 *
 * <p>This interface is meant to be used as the type of a parameter to graph algorithms (such as
 * breadth first traversal) that only need a way of accessing the successors of a node in a graph.
 *
 * <h3>Usage</h3>
 *
 * Given an algorithm, for example:
 *
 * {@snippet :

        assertEquals("/etc/passwd.log", AdminLogAction.sanitizeFilename(". ./. ./etc/passwd.log"));
    }

    @Test
    public void test_sanitizeFilename_pathTraversalPatterns() {
        // Common path traversal attack patterns - multiple slashes are normalized to single
        assertEquals("/etc/passwd.log", AdminLogAction.sanitizeFilename("../etc/passwd.log"));