{"test-bucket-list-object", "/obj", "", "", 0, ListObjectsInfo{}, nil, true},
		// Testing with prefix and truncation (29-30).
		{"test-bucket-list-object", "new", "", "", 1, resultCases[7], nil, true},
		{"test-bucket-list-object", "obj", "", "", 2, resultCases[8], nil, true},
		// Testing with marker, but without prefix and truncation (31-35).
		{"test-bucket-list-object", "", "newPrefix0", "", 6, resultCases[9], nil, true},

        assertEquals("teststring", InputValidator.sanitizeForLogging("test\rstring"));
        assertEquals("teststring", InputValidator.sanitizeForLogging("test\tstring"));

        // Test long string truncation
        String longString = "a".repeat(1100);
        String sanitized = InputValidator.sanitizeForLogging(longString);
        assertEquals(1000, sanitized.length());
        assertTrue(sanitized.endsWith("..."));

        SMBUtil.writeInt2(128, buffer, 56); // Security buffer offset
        // writeInt2(100000) will truncate to 100000 & 0xFFFF = 34464
        SMBUtil.writeInt2(100000, buffer, 58); // This becomes 34464 due to 16-bit truncation

        // Since 34464 is within the 16-bit range but could still be considered excessive for security buffer,
        // let's test the actual validation logic instead

func (b *Buffer) Truncate(n int) {
	if n == 0 {
		b.Reset()
		return
	}
	b.lastRead = opInvalid
	if n < 0 || n > b.Len() {
		panic("bytes.Buffer: truncation out of range")
	}
	b.buf = b.buf[:b.off+n]
}

// Reset resets the buffer to be empty,
// but it retains the underlying storage for use by future writes.
// Reset is the same as [Buffer.Truncate](0).

   */
  @VisibleForTesting
  static int optimalNumOfHashFunctions(double p) {
    // -log(p) / log(2), ensuring the result is rounded to avoid truncation.
    return max(1, (int) Math.round(-Math.log(p) / LOG_TWO));
  }

  /**
   * Computes m (total bits of Bloom filter) which is expected to achieve, for the specified

    /** Pattern for matching shared folder paths */
    protected static final Pattern SHARED_FOLDER_PATTERN = Pattern.compile("^file:/+[^/]\\.");

    /** Ellipsis string for text truncation */
    protected static final String ELLIPSIS = "...";

    /** Whether to encode URL links */
    protected boolean encodeUrlLink = false;

    /** Character encoding for URL links */

				},
			},
		},
		// listMultipartResults - 21.
		// Testing for listing of 3 uploadID's for a given object, setting maxKeys to be 3.
		// There are 3 MultipartInfo in the result (uploadIDs[1-3]), hence no truncation is expected.
		// Since all the MultipartInfo is listed, expecting no values for NextUploadIDMarker and NextKeyMarker.
		// Will be used to list on bucketNames[1].
		{
			MaxUploads:  3,
			IsTruncated: false,

    *   [CVE-2020-15200](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15200),
    *   [CVE-2020-15201](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15201)
*   Fixes an integer truncation vulnerability in code using the work sharder
    API,
    ([CVE-2020-15202](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15202))
*   Fixes a format string vulnerability in `tf.strings.as_string`,

The conversion always yields a valid value; there is no indication of overflow.
</li>
<li>
When converting a <a href="#Numeric_types">floating-point number</a> to an integer, the fraction is discarded
(truncation towards zero).
</li>
<li>
When converting an integer or floating-point number to a floating-point type,
or a <a href="#Numeric_types">complex number</a> to another complex type, the result value is rounded

		err:  ErrHeader,
	}, {
		// BSD tar v3.1.2 rejects a PAX path with NUL in the value, while
		// GNU tar v1.27.1 simply truncates at first NUL.
		// We emulate the behavior of BSD since it is strange doing NUL
		// truncations since PAX records are length-prefix strings instead
		// of NUL-terminated C-strings.
		file: "testdata/pax-nul-path.tar",
		err:  ErrHeader,
	}, {
		file:     "testdata/neg-size.tar.base64",
		obscured: true,