checkSha1("4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da", key, data);
  }

  public void testRfc2202_hmacSha1_case5() {
    byte[] key = fillByteArray(20, 0x0c);
    String data = "Test With Truncation";

    checkSha1("4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04", key, data);
  }

  public void testRfc2202_hmacSha1_case6() {
    byte[] key = fillByteArray(80, 0xaa);

        assertFalse(result.endsWith("..."));
    }

    @Test
    public void test_normalizeScript_truncateBeforeReplace() {
        // Script with control chars beyond the truncation point
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
        for (int i = 0; i < 97; i++) {
            sb.append("x");
        }
        for (int i = 0; i < 53; i++) {
            sb.append("\n");
        }

            final Map<String, Object> doc = new HashMap<>();
            doc.put("title", "Document " + i);
            doc.put("content", "This is a fairly long content for document " + i + " that should cause truncation.");
            documents.add(doc);
        }

        final String result = client.testBuildContext(documents);
        assertTrue(result.length() <= 300); // some overhead from header text
    }

func (b *Buffer) Truncate(n int) {
	if n == 0 {
		b.Reset()
		return
	}
	b.lastRead = opInvalid
	if n < 0 || n > b.Len() {
		panic("bytes.Buffer: truncation out of range")
	}
	b.buf = b.buf[:b.off+n]
}

// Reset resets the buffer to be empty,
// but it retains the underlying storage for use by future writes.
// Reset is the same as [Buffer.Truncate](0).

   */
  @VisibleForTesting
  static int optimalNumOfHashFunctions(double p) {
    // -log(p) / log(2), ensuring the result is rounded to avoid truncation.
    return max(1, (int) Math.round(-Math.log(p) / LOG_TWO));
  }

  /**
   * Computes m (total bits of Bloom filter) which is expected to achieve, for the specified

    for (long x : POSITIVE_LONG_CANDIDATES) {
      for (RoundingMode mode : ALL_SAFE_ROUNDING_MODES) {
        // Promote the long value (rather than using longValue() on the expected value) to avoid
        // any risk of truncation which could lead to a false positive.
        assertEquals(BigIntegerMath.sqrt(valueOf(x), mode), valueOf(LongMath.sqrt(x, mode)));
      }
    }
  }

  /* Relies on the correctness of sqrt(long, FLOOR). */

    /** Pattern for matching shared folder paths */
    protected static final Pattern SHARED_FOLDER_PATTERN = Pattern.compile("^file:/+[^/]\\.");

    /** Ellipsis string for text truncation */
    protected static final String ELLIPSIS = "...";

    /** Whether to encode URL links */
    protected boolean encodeUrlLink = false;

    /** Character encoding for URL links */

    *   [CVE-2020-15200](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15200),
    *   [CVE-2020-15201](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15201)
*   Fixes an integer truncation vulnerability in code using the work sharder
    API,
    ([CVE-2020-15202](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15202))
*   Fixes a format string vulnerability in `tf.strings.as_string`,

The conversion always yields a valid value; there is no indication of overflow.
</li>
<li>
When converting a <a href="#Numeric_types">floating-point number</a> to an integer, the fraction is discarded
(truncation towards zero).
</li>
<li>
When converting an integer or floating-point number to a floating-point type,
or a <a href="#Numeric_types">complex number</a> to another complex type, the result value is rounded

		err:  ErrHeader,
	}, {
		// BSD tar v3.1.2 rejects a PAX path with NUL in the value, while
		// GNU tar v1.27.1 simply truncates at first NUL.
		// We emulate the behavior of BSD since it is strange doing NUL
		// truncations since PAX records are length-prefix strings instead
		// of NUL-terminated C-strings.
		file: "testdata/pax-nul-path.tar",
		err:  ErrHeader,
	}, {
		file:     "testdata/neg-size.tar.base64",
		obscured: true,