- Sort Score
- Result 10 results
- Languages All
Results 1 - 10 of 297 for nonces (0.15 sec)
-
src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go
hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16]) copy(c.key[:], hKey) // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space. cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) return c.seal(dst, cNonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) } func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { if len(nonce) != NonceSizeX {
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Tue Nov 09 20:10:44 UTC 2021 - 2.5K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/crypto/aes/gcm_s390x.go
} // deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce. // See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1. func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(nonce []byte) gcmCount { // GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter // state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path" // for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along // with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon May 13 18:57:38 UTC 2024 - 11.3K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/crypto/cipher/gcm.go
// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter // is computed by passing it through the GHASH function. if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize { copy(counter[:], nonce) counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1 } else { var y gcmFieldElement g.update(&y, nonce) y.high ^= uint64(len(nonce)) * 8 g.mul(&y) byteorder.BePutUint64(counter[:8], y.low)
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon May 13 18:57:38 UTC 2024 - 13.7K bytes - Viewed (0) -
staging/src/k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/storage/value/encrypt/aes/aes.go
// key with random 96-bit nonces (the default nonce length) no more than 2^32 times, and // therefore transformers using this implementation *must* ensure they allow for frequent key // rotation. Future work should include investigation of AES-GCM-SIV as an alternative to // random nonces. func NewGCMTransformer(block cipher.Block) (value.Transformer, error) {
Registered: Sat Jun 15 01:39:40 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Fri Jul 21 19:25:52 UTC 2023 - 9.6K bytes - Viewed (0) -
staging/src/k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/storage/value/encrypt/aes/aes_extended_nonce.go
// is assumed to be a cryptographically strong slice of MinSeedSizeExtendedNonceGCM+ random bytes. // Unlike NewGCMTransformer, this function is immune to the birthday attack because a new key is generated // per encryption via a key derivation function: KDF(seed, random_bytes) -> key. The derived key is
Registered: Sat Jun 15 01:39:40 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Fri Jul 21 19:25:52 UTC 2023 - 6.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
pilot/pkg/features/experimental.go
).Get() EnableDistributionTracking = env.Register( "PILOT_ENABLE_CONFIG_DISTRIBUTION_TRACKING", false, "If enabled, Pilot will assign meaningful nonces to each Envoy configuration message, and allow "+ "users to interrogate which envoy has which config from the debug interface.", ).Get() DistributionHistoryRetention = env.Register(
Registered: Fri Jun 14 15:00:06 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Tue May 14 17:02:38 UTC 2024 - 10.2K bytes - Viewed (0) -
pilot/pkg/xds/debug.go
// it because is is a b64 encoding of a 64 bit array, which will always be 12 chars in length. // len = ceil(bitlength/(2^6))+1 const VersionLen = 12 func (s *DiscoveryServer) getResourceVersion(nonce, key string, cache map[string]string) string { if len(nonce) < VersionLen { return "" } configVersion := nonce[:VersionLen]
Registered: Fri Jun 14 15:00:06 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Tue Apr 30 00:26:45 UTC 2024 - 39.5K bytes - Viewed (0) -
staging/src/k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/storage/value/encrypt/envelope/kmsv2/envelope.go
var block cipher.Block block, err = aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { return nil, err } // this is compatible with NewGCMTransformerWithUniqueKeyUnsafe for decryption // it would use random nonces for encryption but we never do that transformer, err = aestransformer.NewGCMTransformer(block) } if err != nil { return nil, err } t.cache.set(cacheKey, transformer) return transformer, nil }
Registered: Sat Jun 15 01:39:40 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Fri Oct 27 00:23:50 UTC 2023 - 18.7K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
// and the private key, to protect the key in case rand fails. This is // equivalent in security to RFC 6979 deterministic nonce generation, but still // produces randomized signatures. func mixedCSPRNG(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (io.Reader, error) { // This implementation derives the nonce from an AES-CTR CSPRNG keyed by: // // SHA2-512(priv.D || entropy || hash)[:32] //
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu May 23 00:11:18 UTC 2024 - 20.4K bytes - Viewed (0) -
src/crypto/tls/conn.go
// The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an explicit nonce so that the // nonce can be random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes which is // too small for a secure, random nonce. Therefore we use the // sequence number as the nonce. The 3DES-CBC construction also has // an 8 bytes nonce but its nonces must be unpredictable (see RFC // 5246, Appendix F.3), forcing us to use randomness. That's not
Registered: Wed Jun 12 16:32:35 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu May 23 03:10:12 UTC 2024 - 51.8K bytes - Viewed (0)